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Newspapers reported serious voting problems starting with the first day of early 
voting in the 2004 General Election and continuing through Election Day and 
beyond.  
Voters' selections changed in front of their eyes on the touch screens of paperless 
voting machines. Electronic poll books failed to work properly. Tabulation 
equipment began subtracting votes after accumulated totals reached 32,000. 
Voting machines lost votes, miscounted votes, and mysteriously added votes. 
Machines broke down, froze up, paged through ballots backwards, and skipped 
past important races.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © 2006 VotersUnite! 
 www.VotersUnite.Org 
Second Edition, Version 1.6 
www.VotersUnite.Org/MB2.pdf 
Preface iii 
Preface 
The first edition of this compendium originated as a result of an email conversation I had with an 
election official. I had become more and more bewildered by the resistance to a voter-verified 
paper audit trail (VVPAT) on election equipment. Discovering that she was in favor of a VVPAT, 
I asked her why so many were resistant.  
Her reply was enlightening. She pointed out that, with the recent eruption of information and 
opinions on electronic elections, it's extremely difficult to tell which "studies" are legitimate and 
which are rumor. Then she said, "Add in a dose of politics — the comments about Diebold Execs 
and Bush ties – and you have a real mess. Make sense?"  
It did. Most of the officials responsible for making election system decisions don't have time to do 
the extensive, time-consuming research required to learn the enormous variety of information 
that has become available about voting systems. Those in one state may not be aware of the 
problems election officials in other states are encountering with the equipment they are using.  
For example, how many officials responsible for our elections know such tidbits as these?  
♦ Hinds County, Mississippi had to hold its November 2003 election all over again because so 
many of the paperless electronic voting machines (Direct Record Electronic – DRE) broke 
down that they couldn't determine the will of the voters.  
♦ Neglecting to keep the DRE batteries charged between elections cost Arapahoe County, 
Colorado over $100,000 in battery replacements just before a recent election.  
♦ If it takes an hour to do the Logic and Accuracy testing on one DRE, San Diego county would 
have to spend 1275 person-days testing before every election in order to comply with 
California law.  
This slightly renamed "revised edition" has been updated to include additional facts that have 
emerged since the first edition was completed.  
Information is always essential to making wise decisions. That premise is the basis for this 
collection of facts, which is sort of a consumer's guide to voting systems. As the events 
surrounding elections have become more publicized – especially after the 2004 General Election 
— it has become clear that electronic elections bring with them many, many problems.  
This booklet is simply a collection of relevant information; it is by no means an exhaustive work 
on the issue. I offer it in the hope that it will help those reading it to make wise decisions 
regarding our election systems. 
Respectfully,  
Ellen Theisen 
VotersUnite! 
ellen@votersunite.org 
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 Overview 
Election transparency is the fundamental basis of election integrity.  
In transparent elections, all the processes of handling and counting ballots are completely open to 
public view. Nothing is hidden, nothing is secret – except, of course, each individual's voting 
choices.  
Election fraud and miscounts have occurred throughout history, and they will continue to occur. 
Transparency is the only way to minimize them, but with electronic voting, transparency is 
eclipsed. Electronic processes that record and count the votes are not open to public scrutiny. 
Courts have ruled that election software is a trade secret, so even a losing candidate with a 
computer consultant cannot view it.  
With electronic voting, the most important and vulnerable election processes – storing and 
tallying the votes – are performed in secret, without public oversight. These processes were not 
developed by government officials charged with ensuring election integrity, but by anonymous 
software engineers, hired by vendors and not publicly accountable for the results of their work.  
One would expect overwhelming benefits to accompany this sacrifice of transparency and the 
resulting loss of public control over election processes. That's the myth. Ironically, overwhelming 
disadvantages accompany the sacrifice. The logical question is "Why make the sacrifice?" It's a 
question more and more people are asking.  
The facts presented in this document dispel many of the myths surrounding electronic voting. It 
is crucial to lay these myths to rest quickly, for as long as they are held by decision-makers, our 
democracy is at risk.  
Here is a summary of some of the myth breakers presented in this document Page 
♦ No federal law requires us to record and count votes electronically  1 
♦ In recent elections, electronic voting machines have: 
- failed to count votes  4 
- tallied votes incorrectly  5 
- given voters the wrong ballot 9 
- broken down during elections  9 
- handed votes to the wrong candidate  9 
- disenfranchised voters  11 
- reversed election outcomes  10 
♦ The use of DREs increases: 
- the time required for pre-election testing  22 
- the complexity of election procedures  25 
- the need for "ballot box" security  35 
- the potential for human error  36  
- the cost of storing election equipment between elections  50 
- the capital cost of election systems  53 
♦ DREs are not the only way to provide independent voting for the disabled  44 
♦ Some of the stories of successful electronic elections are not based on facts  56 
♦ Some of the staunchest defenders of DREs have received donations from vendors  60 
Electronic elections are not transparent 
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1  Facts about The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 
HAVA1, passed by Congress in the Fall 2002, was an attempt to prevent problems like those 
encountered in the 2000 Presidential election. It offered funding for counties to upgrade their 
voting systems. One of its few mandates was to require voting methods that would allow the 
disabled to vote independently. As states and localities rush to comply with HAVA, many 
decision-makers are operating on common misunderstandings of the law. The sections below 
provide facts that correct some of the major misconceptions. 
HAVA Does Not Require the Use of DREs2 
Section 301(a)(3) of HAVA requires that each polling place provide at least one voting method 
that allows disabled individuals to vote in privacy. Accessibility is required; DREs are not. 
(3) Accessibility for individuals with disabilities.--The voting system shall— 
(A) be accessible for individuals with disabilities, including nonvisual accessibility for 
the blind and visually impaired, in a manner that provides the same opportunity for 
access and participation (including privacy and independence) as for other voters;  
(B) satisfy the requirement of subparagraph (A) through the use of at least one direct 
recording electronic voting system or other voting system equipped for individuals 
with disabilities at each polling place; and 
Voting systems that record votes electronically (Direct Record Electronic – DRE) are only one of 
the many available voting systems that provide accessibility for disabled individuals. Alternative 
voting systems that allow the disabled to vote unassisted are available and cost a fraction of the 
price of DREs. For example:  
♦ Electronic ballot-marking devices, such as the AutoMark by ES&S.3 
♦ The Vote-PAD, a non-electronic accessible device for marking paper ballots.4 
♦ Free ballot-printing software offered by Open Voting Consortium to run on PC systems.5 
HAVA Does Not Prohibit Punch Card Systems 
A common misconception is that HAVA bans the use of old voting systems. This is not true, 
although old systems must be supplemented with ballots that allow disabled individuals to vote 
independently and they must provide a manual audit capacity. A state must replace old systems 
only if it accepts Title I funds to upgrade voting systems. Section 301(c)(1) is very clear:  
In general.--Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit a State or 
jurisdiction which used a particular type of voting system in the elections for Federal 
office held in November 2000 from using the same type of system after the effective 
date of this section, so long as the system meets or is modified to meet the 
requirements of this section. 
While state legislation, executive orders, or judicial orders require certain jurisdictions to replace 
their punch card systems, HAVA does not make that requirement. In fact, HAVA Section 
301(a)(1)(B) specifically allows the use of punch card systems in conjunction with an educational 
program to help prevent over-voting and teach voters how to correct their ballots.  
                                                          
1 http://www.fec.gov/hava/law_ext.txt 
2 Direct Recording Electronic voting machine. Votes are recorded on electronic media rather than paper. 
3 http://www.essvote.com/HTML/home.html; see page 46 of this document 
4 http://www.vote-pad.us; see page 46 of this document 
5 http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/; see page 47 of this document 
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HAVA Preserves States' Right to Use Paper Ballots 
Some election officials are under the impression that HAVA requires them to abandon paper-
based systems. This is completely false. Not only does HAVA preserve the right to use paper 
ballots, it also requires paper for audits.  
While HAVA does not specifically require a voter-verified paper trail, it does mandate that 
voting systems be able to produce a "permanent paper record with a manual audit capacity."  
HAVA also explicitly preserves jurisdictions' rights to use paper ballots. Section 301(c)(2) 
specifically  says that the term "verify" may not be construed to forbid the use of paper ballots. It 
states: 
(2) Protection of paper ballot voting systems.--For purposes of subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the 
term "verify" may not be defined in a manner that makes it impossible for a paper ballot 
voting system to meet the requirements of such subsection or to be modified to meet 
such requirements. 
HAVA "Audit" Requirement is Not a Meaningful Recount 
HAVA Section 301(a)(2) states the audit requirements for voting systems:  
(2) Audit capacity.-- 
(A) In general.--The voting system shall produce a record with an audit capacity for 
such system. 
(B) Manual audit capacity.-- 
(i) The voting system shall produce a permanent paper record with a manual 
audit capacity for such system. 
(ii) The voting system shall provide the voter with an opportunity to change the 
ballot or correct any error before the permanent paper record is produced. 
(iii) The paper record produced under subparagraph (A) shall be available as an 
official record for any recount conducted with respect to any election in which the 
system is used. 
While HAVA requires that all voting systems produce a paper record in order to provide a 
manual audit capacity, the paper record of a DRE is interpreted by voting machine vendors and 
some election officials to refer to an end-of-day printout of either the totals or the ballot images. 
However, Darryl Wold, former chairman of the Federal Elections Commission, claims that a 
system audit requires an independent check on the accuracy of the system and that only paper 
records inspected and approved by voters provide the means for that independent check.6   
Computer experts point out that if a DRE makes errors in recording or storing votes, its end-of-
day printouts will be incorrect and no meaningful audit can be done. When a machine produces 
results a second time, it's merely a reprint, not a recount.  
In fact, when a full hand recount of the 2004 gubernatorial race was conducted in Washington 
State, all parties realized the futility of printing and counting the ballot images and agreed to 
simply re-accumulate the electronic vote data.7 
                                                          
6 The HAVA Requirement For a Voter Verified Paper Record. Darryl R. Wold; July 23, 2003 
http://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/documents/HAVA_Requirement_for_VVP_Record.pdf 
7 http://www.co.snohomish.wa.us/documents/Departments/auditor/elections/results/general/ 
DREAgreement.pdf 
1  Facts about The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) 3 
HAVA Allows Partial Replacement of Old Systems 
If the state does not meet the deadline for replacing punch card systems and lever systems, the 
state simply repays any replacement funds received for the precincts that did not meet the 
deadline. Section 102(d) states: 
(d) Repayment of Funds for Failure To Meet Deadlines.-- 
(1) In general.--If a State receiving funds under the program under this section fails to 
meet the deadline applicable to the State under subsection (a)(3), the State shall pay 
to the Administrator an amount equal to the noncompliant precinct percentage of the 
amount of the funds provided to the State under the program. 
(2) Noncompliant precinct percentage defined.--In this subsection, the term 
"noncompliant precinct percentage" means, with respect to a State, the amount 
(expressed as a percentage) equal to the quotient of-- 
(A) the number of qualifying precincts within the State for which the State failed 
to meet the applicable deadline; and 
(B) the total number of qualifying precincts in the State. 
HAVA Preserves States' Rights to Establish Voting Equipment Standards 
While HAVA established the Election Assistance Commission (EAC) and charged it with 
developing guidelines and voting system standards, new standards have not yet been developed, 
so the standards developed by the Federal Election Commission in 2002 are still the current set. 
Furthermore, compliance with the EAC guidelines is not required in order to receive HAVA 
funds for voting equipment upgrades or purchases. 
This means that states retain control over whether or not they upgrade voting equipment to the 
FEC 2002 standards, which at the time of this writing are the current standards. In fact, very few 
of the present systems meet these three-year old standards. Nearly all equipment only meets 
obsolete standards developed in 1990. Refer ahead to page 19 for a discussion of the inadequacy 
of the 2002 standards.  
Section 221(b) says the voting system guidelines to be developed by the Technical Guidelines 
Development Committee to assist the states in purchasing new equipment are "voluntary."  
Section 311(a) says the EAC guidelines are intended to assist the states in meeting the voting 
system requirements and specifically calls the guidelines "voluntary." And Section 251(d) says 
that compliance with the EAC standards is not a condition of receiving funds to meet the 
requirements:  
Adoption of Commission Guidelines and Guidance Not Required To Receive Payment.--
Nothing in this part may be construed to require a State to implement any of the voluntary 
voting system guidelines or any of the voluntary guidance adopted by the Commission 
with respect to any matter as a condition for receiving a requirements payment. 
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2  E-Voting Problems in Recent Elections 
Errors and malfunctions are inescapable with electronic election equipment, just as they are with 
any other type of mechanical or electronic device. Failures of paperless Direct Recording 
Electronic (DRE) systems almost always leave unanswered questions. While optical scan systems 
also fail, they provide a way to recover since those systems include paper ballots that can be 
recounted. Audits of computerized systems, by examining original documents, are mandatory 
for financial institutions and brokerage houses, but such audits are not mandatory for elections.  
Ten Common Electronic Election Problems 
While many people are advocating the use of a voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT) on 
DREs, VVPAT wouldn't have been sufficient to fix many of the problems that counties have faced 
when they used DRE systems. This fact causes many people to question the wisdom of using 
paperless DREs at all, even if they have a printer attached.  
Many different types of e-voting problems have occurred in recent years. Hundreds of elections 
have been impacted by malfunctions, which have disenfranchised voters and called the results of 
elections into question. In some cases, paper backup was available, and election officials were 
able to determine the voters' intents. In other cases, there was NO paper backup, and localities 
have either certified the elections anyway or conducted a second election to replace the first.  
Hundreds of electronic election malfunctions have been reported in newspapers in recent years, 
more than 125 of them from the 2004 general election alone.8 Here are a few of examples of 
common problems serious enough to be reported in the news.  
1) Electronic Voting Machines Lose Ballots 
Carteret County, North Carolina. November, 2004. Unilect Patriot DRE 
A memory limitation on the DRE caused 4,438 votes to be permanently lost.9  
Unilect claimed their paperless voting machines would store 10,500 votes, but they only store 
3,005. After the first 3,005 voters, the machines accepted -- but did not store -- the ballots of 4,438 
people in the 2004 Presidential election.  
Jack Gerbel, president and owner of Dublin-Calif.-based UniLect, told The Associated Press that 
there is no way to retrieve the missing data. Since the agriculture commissioner's race was 
decided by a 2,287-vote margin, there was no way to determine the winner. The State Board of 
Elections ordered a new election,10 but that decision is being challenged in the court.  
At the time of this writing, a debate is waging over whether or not to hold a new election, which 
is estimated to cost $3 million and draw a low turnout. 11 
                                                          
8 VotersUnite! Election 2004 Problem Log. http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp?sort= 
date&selectstate=ALL&selectproblemtype=Machine+malfunction 
9 Computer loses more than 4,000 early votes in Carteret. Charlotte Observer. November 4, 2004. 
Associated Press. http://www.charlotte.com/mld/observer/news/local/10099907.htm 
10 N.C. agriculture commissioner candidate appeals new statewide election. North County Times. January 
4, 2005. By Gary D. Robertson - Associated Press. 
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2005/01/05/election2004/20_40_441_4_05.txt 
11 Certify Troxler. Winston-Salem Journal. December 21, 2004. 
http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ%2FMGArticle%2FWSJ_ColumnistArticle
&c=MGArticle&cid=1031779782822&path=!opinion&s=1037645509163 
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Palm Beach County, Florida. November 2004. Sequoia DRE 
Battery failure causes DREs to lose about 37 votes. 
Nine voting machines ran out of battery power and nearly 40 votes may have been lost. 
... The nine machines at a Boynton Beach precinct weren't plugged in properly, and their 
batteries wore down around 9:30 a.m., said Marty Rogol spokesman for Palm Beach 
County Supervisor of Elections Theresa LePore. 
Poll clerk Joyce Gold said 37 votes appeared to be missing after she compared the 
computer records to the sign-in sheet. Elections officials won't know exactly how many 
votes were lost until after polls close.12 
2) Electronic Election Equipment Inexplicably Adds Ballots 
In the first two months after the 2004 General Election, phantom votes (more votes than voters) 
were reported in Florida, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Carolina, and Washington.13 At 
the time of this writing, reports of additional phantom votes continue to flood into the news.  
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. November, 2004. Microvote DRE  
Results show nearly 3,000 more votes than voters.  
According to election-office data downloaded by the Charlotte Observer, 102,109 people voted 
early or returned valid absentee ballots. But unofficial results show 106,064 people casting early 
and absentee votes for president.14  
Officials suspected that some results may have been counted twice. But they were wrong. A news 
release from the Mecklenburg County Board of Elections shows that some candidates gained 
votes in the manual recount of the paper tapes printed by the machine.15 The machine or the 
accumulation software simply tallied wrong.  
Lancaster County, Nebraska. November, 2004. ES&S Optical Scanner.16 
Optical scanners double-count ballots. 
As the optical scanners read the election-day ballots, they occasionally added votes. While 
County Election Commissioner David Shively explained that the software was reading ballots 
twice, ES&S referred to the misread as a mechanical problem. 
Inexplicably, both Shively and the Nebraska deputy secretary of state for elections, Neal 
Erickson, agreed that "the malfunctions were not the type that taint vote counts." When the 
officials tested the six machines, it became clear that two were not correctly counting the ballots.  
That came as a surprise, Shively said, because all were tested late last week and 
performed well. 
After consulting with ES&S, Shively decided to use the two absentee-ballot machines to speed up 
the election-day counting, but the problem was apparently contagious. The double-counting 
problem began plaguing almost all the machines.  
                                                          
12 Nearly 40 Votes May Have Been Lost In Palm Beach County. Associated Press. November 2, 2004. 
13 http://www.votersunite.org/info/previousmessups.asp 
14 County retallies early-vote results. The Charlotte Observer. Nov. 4, 2004. By Richard Rubin and Carrie 
Levine. http://www.charlotte.com/mld/charlotte/news/politics/10094165.htm 
15 Board of Elections Audits Early Voting Results; Revises Unofficial Results Released by the 
Mecklenburg Board of Elections. November 4, 2004. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/mecklenburgnewsrelease.pdf 
16 Problem machines spur call for recount. Lincoln Journal Star. November 14, 2004. By Nate Jenkins. 
http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2004/11/14/election/doc4189b9c7f14bf764391458.txt 
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Bernalillo County, New Mexico. November, 2004 
Over 8,000 phantom votes appear in the canvass report.  
The New Mexico certified election results reported 2,087 phantom votes (more votes than ballots 
cast) for president statewide. These phantom votes were concentrated in Bernalillo County. The 
official canvass report shows 187 precincts in Bernalillo County reporting presidential phantom 
votes — a total of 1,239 votes.17 
For example:  
♦ Precinct 558 reported 178 early voting ballots and a total of 319 votes for president. That's 141 
phantom votes, nearly as high as the number of ballots.  
♦ Precinct 512 reported 166 ballots, with 318 votes for president. In that precinct, Bush alone 
received 206 votes, 50 more than the number of ballots.  
In the presidential race and 14 down-ticket contests examined and shown in the chart below, a 
total of 8,656 phantom votes were reported in the certified canvass report.  
 
In October of 2004, Bernalillo County Clerk Mary Herrera admitted that phantom votes had been 
added to several elections over the past two years. She also said her vote-counting experts have 
always found the phantom votes before they were added to the final tally.18 But not in this 
election.  
New Mexico Secretary of State Rebecca Vigil-Giron says phantom votes are not possible, pointing 
out that her independent auditors didn't find irregularities like this.19 Nevertheless, they are 
present in her certified canvass report. 
                                                          
17 Bernalillo County Canvass of Returns of General Election Held on November 2, 2004. State of New 
Mexico. http://www.sos.state.nm.us/PDF/Bernalillo.pdf 
 Brief Summary of Bernalillo County Election Data. January 5, 2005. By Ellen Theisen.  
18 County clerk say phantom votes won't be a problem. KRQE Albuquerque. October 26, 2004. 
http://www.krqe.com/expanded3.asp?RECORD_KEY%5BLargeHeadline%5D=ID&ID%5BLargeHeadlin
e%5D=7425.  
19 Vote Recount Fight 'Is Not Over'.  Albuquerque Journal. December 24, 2004.  By Andy Lenderman. 
http://www.abqjournal.com/elex/278376elex12-24-04.htm 
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3) Tabulation Software Reaches 32,767 Votes and Counts Backwards 
Broward County, Florida. November 2004. ES&S DRE System 
Vote tabulation software loses 70,000 votes for Amendment 4. 
The bug, discovered two years ago but never fixed, began subtracting votes after the 
absentee tally hit 32,500 -- a ceiling put in place by the software makers. ''Clearly it's a 
concern about the integrity of the voting system,'' said Broward County Mayor Ilene 
Lieberman, a canvassing board member who was overseeing the count. "This glitch 
needs to be fixed immediately.''  
The problem, which resulted in the shocking discovery of about 70,000 votes for 
Amendment 4, a measure allowing a referendum on Las Vegas-style slots at parimutuels 
in Miami-Dade and Broward, came to light just after midnight Wednesday when 
Broward's canvassing board shut down.20  
Orange County, Florida. November, 2004. ES&S Optical Scan System 
Vote tabulating software omits counting 8,400 votes.21 
The precinct results posted on the Orange County elections office Web site showed that Democrat 
John Kerry beat Republican President Bush by 9,227 votes in Orange County, but the posted 
results were off by 8,400 votes. The margin was actually only 827 votes.  
The cause of the error, Orange officials said Thursday, was a software program that 
could not tabulate more than 32,767 votes in a single precinct. A similar discrepancy 
affected vote totals posted online for the U.S. Senate race between Republican Mel 
Martinez and Democrat Betty Castor.  
Guilford County, North Carolina. November, 2004. ES&S DRE System  
Vote tabulating software changes two outcomes in Guilford County.  
In Guilford County, ES&S early voting machines also had capacity problems. The totals were so 
large, the tabulation computer threw some numbers away. Retallying changed two outcomes and 
gave an additional 22,000 votes to Kerry.22 
Ken Carbullido, Vice President of ES&S Product Development, explained the problem to 
Guilford County. In very technical language, he wrote that when the vote totals reached 32,767 
(32K), the system began subtracting from the totals.23  
The 32,767 capacity limitation at a single precinct level is a function of the design and 
definition of the results database used by ERM [Election Reporting Manager]. The data 
storage element used to record votes at the precinct level is a two byte binary field. 
32,767 is 2 to the 15th power, which is the maximum number held by a two byte word (16 
bits) in memory, where the most significant bit is reserved as the sign bit (a plus or minus 
indicator). Additionally, ERM precinct count level data is stored in a binary computer 
format known as two’s complement.....  
In the letter, Mr. Carbullido admitted the company knew about the problem but had not advised 
the county.  
                                                          
20 Gambling vote glitch mars tally. Miami Herald. November 5, 2004. By Erika Bolstad And Curtis Morgan. 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/10103931.htm 
21 Distrust fuels doubts on votes: Orange's Web site posted wrong totals. Orlando Sentinel. November 12, 
2004. By David Damron, Sentinel Staff Writer. http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3803 
22 Winner so far: Confusion. The Charlotte Observer. November 5, 2004. By Mark Johnson. 
http://www.charlotte.com/mld/observer/news/local/10104576.htm?1c 
23 http://www.votersunite.org/info/GuilfordESS.pdf 
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4) Votes Jump to the Opponent on the Screen 
Maryland. November, 2004. Diebold DRE 
Some voters manage to correct the vote-jumping on the screen, some don't. 
On election day, TrueVoteMD registered 383 reports involving 531 incidents of problems 
encountered by voters. Among a myriad of other problems detailed in the report, many voters 
reported votes switching on the screens. Here are some excerpts:24 
Voter Ethel Kerscher at Leisure World Clubhouse in Montgomery County was directed by 
an election judge to use another machine after she noticed that her vote had been 
switched from one candidate to another. She submitted her ballot on the second 
machine, but left the polling place shaken and upset.  
Voter David Solomon at the Good Hope Community Center in Montgomery County tried 
twice to vote for his preferred candidate, but each time the “X” appeared next to another 
candidate’s name. After getting the assistance of an election judge, he tried a third time 
and believes he was successful—but is not certain.  
Voter Robin Wayne Hood at Havre de Grace H.S. in Harford County tried to change his 
erroneous selection for president and, while doing so, accidentally submitted his ballot—
worse still, before he had made selections for the other races. “A machine should not be 
allowed to do my voting for me,” he protested.  
Snohomish County, Washington. November, 2004. Sequoia DRE 
Voters find vote-jumping difficult to correct.  
Voters in at least four polling precincts in Snohomish County said they encountered 
problems with the electronic voting machines. When they touched the screen to vote for a 
candidate, voters said an indicator showed they had selected the opposing candidate.  
Those voters told KING5 News it took at least four attempts before the indicator showed 
the correct candidate.25 
Bernalillo County, New Mexico. October, 2004. Sequoia DRE 
Votes for Kerry jump to Bush.  
When the same problem occurred in Bernalillo County, New Mexico, it took some voters as many 
as three times to get the machine to register their votes for Kerry instead of switching the 
selection to Bush.  
Kim Griffith voted on Thursday— over and over and over. 
She's among the people in Bernalillo and Sandoval counties who say they have had 
trouble with early voting equipment. When they have tried to vote for a particular 
candidate, the touch-screen system has said they voted for somebody else. 
It's a problem that can be fixed by the voters themselves— people can alter the 
selections on their ballots, up to the point when they indicate they are finished and 
officially cast the ballot. 
For Griffith, it took a lot of altering.26 
                                                          
24 When the Right to Vote Goes Wrong. TrueVoteMD. November, 2004. 
http://www.truevotemd.org/Election_Report.pdf 
25 Scattered reports of voters being blocked and machine malfunctions. November 2, 2004. KING5 News. 
http://www.king5.com/topstories/stories/NW_110204ELBelectronicvotingproblemsLJ.1aac5fda.html 
26 Some Early Voters Say Machines Mark Incorrect Choices. ABQJournal. October 22, 2004. By Jim 
Ludwick, Journal Staff Writer. http://abqjournal.com/elex/246845elex10-22-04.htm 
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5) DREs Provide Incorrect Ballots 
Maryland. March 2004.  
The U.S. Senate contest was omitted from ballots in three counties. 
Jeffrey Liss had finished making his selections on Maryland’s Democratic-primary ballot 
and strolled out of the polling place at Chevy Chase Elementary School on the morning of 
March 2, Super Tuesday. On the sidewalk, he spied a campaign posted for Senator 
Barbara Mikulski, who is running for her fourth term. Funny, he thought, he didn’t 
remember voting in the Senate race. 
Liss went back inside to talk to an election official. And another, and another. He was told 
he must have overlooked the Senate race on the electronic touch-screen voting machine. 
But Liss, a lawyer, finally persuaded a technician to check the apparatus. Sure enough, it 
wasn’t displaying the whole ballot. 
According to voter complaints collected by Mikulski, who won in the primary, her race 
didn’t appear on ballots in at least three Maryland counties.27 
Orange County, California. March 2004  
Incorrect access codes gave voters incorrect ballots. 
Poll workers struggling with a new electronic voting system in last week's election gave 
thousands of Orange County voters the wrong ballots, according to a Times analysis of 
election records. In 21 precincts where the problem was most acute, there were more 
ballots cast than registered voters.  
At polling places where the problem was most apparent because of turnouts exceeding 
100%, an estimated 1,500 voters cast the wrong ballots, according to the Times' 
analysis of official county election data. Tallies at an additional 55 polling places with 
turnouts more than double the county average of 37% suggest at least 5,500 voters had 
their ballots tabulated for the wrong precincts.28  
6) Election-Specific Programming Miscounts Votes 
Franklin County. Indiana. November, 2004. Fidlar Optical Scan System  
Democratic votes were counted as Libertarian. 
Optical scan equipment counted straight-party Democratic votes as Libertarian votes. County 
officials and Fidler technicians agree that an election programming error in the Fidlar optical scan 
system caused the miscount. One outcome was overturned when the program was corrected.29 
Carroll County, North Carolina. November, 2004. ES&S Optical Scan System 
Vendor mis-programming caused the miscount.  
The chip supplied by ES&S for the election was incorrectly programmed and miscounted the 
votes for the JP District 2 race between Rocky Whitely and Duane Coatney. Once ES&S supplies a 
new chip for the optical scanners, the county will rescan the ballots for that contest. 30 
                                                          
27 The Vexations of Voting Machines. Time Magazine. May 3, 2004. By Viveca Novak. 
http://www.time.com/time/archive/preview/from_redirect/0,10987,1101040503-629410,00.html 
28 7,000 Orange County Voters Were Given Bad Ballots. Los Angeles Times; March 9, 2004; By Ray F. 
Herndon and Stuart Pfeifer. Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=1476 
29 Fidlar admits election blip. Quad City Times. November 13, 2004. By Tory Brecht. Reproduced at 
http://www.qctimes.com/internal.php?story_id=1039447&t=Local+News&c=2,1039447 
30 Computer glitch blamed for miscount in JP voting. Star Tribune. November 10, 2004. By Anna Mathews, 
CCN staff writer. http://www.greenforesttribune.com/articles/2004/11/10/news/s1.txt 
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Lake County, Illinois. April, 2003. ES&S Optical Scan System  
Vendor mis-programmed again.  
The problem was caused by a programming error that failed to account for "no candidate" 
listings in some races on the ballot, Clerk Willard Helander said Thursday. As a result, 
election results were placed next to the names of the wrong candidates in four different 
races, including in Waukegan's 9th Ward. 
... Helander blamed the problem on Election Systems & Software, the Omaha company 
in charge of operating the county's optical-scan voting machines. She said a company 
official told her the programmers were unaware the county would have "no candidate" 
listings on its ballot.31 
7) DREs Break Down During the Election 
Maryland. November, 2004. Diebold DRE 
Miscellaneous break downs plague voters. 
Excerpts from the TrueVoteMD report show some of the malfunctions that disenfranchised 
voters in Maryland.32 
Voter Lavellette White at Francis Scott Key Middle School in Montgomery County tried to 
vote for the school board, but when she made her selection the screen went dark and the 
machine spit out her ballot card. The election judge told her there was nothing he could do.  
Voter Michael Heyman at Maryvale Elementary School in Montgomery County reported 
that the machine froze when he attempted to review his ballot prior to submission. The 
election judge told him that it was a persistent problem with that particular machine. The 
judge removed a sticker from the machine and inserted a key to reboot. At first the 
machine would not eject the smart card, but finally it did and voting continued.   
Mahoning County, Ohio. November, 2004. ES&S DRE 
Machines broke down in 16 precincts; others needed calibration. 
Many problems plagued the ES&S iVotronic touch screen voting machines in 16 of the 312 
Mahoning County precincts.  
Some of the machines malfunctioned. Others had problems with the personal electronic 
ballot cartridge placed into the machines before each vote to count the ballots ... Also, 
there were 20 to 30 machines that needed to be recalibrated during the voting process 
because some votes for a candidate were being counted for that candidate's opponent. 
About a dozen machines needed to be reset because they essentially froze.33  
                                                          
31 Returns are in: Software goofed — Lake County tally misled 15 hopefuls. (reproduced) Chicago 
Tribune; April 4, 2003; By Susan Kuczka, Tribune staff reporter. http://www.vote.caltech.edu/mail-
archives/votingtech/Apr-2003/0096.html 
32 When the Right to Vote Goes Wrong. TrueVoteMD. November, 2004. 
http://www.truevotemd.org/Election_Report.pdf 
33 Errors plague voting process in Ohio, Pa. Vindicator. November 3, 2004. Vindicator staff. 
http://www.vindy.com/basic/news/281829446390855.php 
Back up! We need back up! Roanoke.com. November 11, 2004. By Brian Gottstein. 
http://www.roanoke.com/columnists/gottstein/13719.html 
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Broward County, Florida. October, 2004. ES&S DRE  
Break downs require voters to come back the next day.  
Hundreds of voters showed up to vote early at Howard Forman Health Park, so many that a 
decision was made to keep the voting facility open until 11 p.m.  
Some people waited in line from early in the day until after the sun went down. Unfortunately, 
for a group of about 50 people, the waiting did not pay off. A mechanical problem with the 
voting machines caused election workers to close down polling place.  
The group of 50 frustrated voters will have the opportunity to be first in line to vote today. Poll 
workers took down their numbers and names and will move them to the head of the line.  
For one couple, it may not be enough. They were voting on Sunday because they planned to 
leave on vacation today. Now they will have to choose to cancel their trip, or give up their 
chance to vote.34 
8) Electronic Voting Machines Fail to Start Up 
Bexar County, Texas. October, 2004. ES&S DRE  
Uncharged batteries in several ES&S touch-screen voting machines hampered early 
morning voting at a southeast Bexar County precinct for about two hours today, officials 
said. Poll workers at Sinclair Elementary School realized just before 7 a.m. that the voting 
machines were dead.  
By 9 a.m., county technicians had powered up the machines, but not before dozens of 
people had left, either in frustration or because they were late for work.35  
Orleans Parish, Louisiana. November, 2004.  
In Orleans Parish and nearby parishes, ten polling places were reported to have machines that 
weren't working on election-day morning.36  
9) Registration Data Transmission Fails 
Many counties used "electronic poll books" during the 2004 election, so that poll workers could 
connect computers to the general voter registration database and look up voters online rather 
than in a paper poll book. But as early voting got underway, failure after failure turned this 
supposed convenience into long waits and possible disenfranchisement for many voters. These 
failures occurred in Shelby County, TN; Broward, Hillsborough and Pinellas Counties, FL; Bexar 
and Tarrant Counties, TX; two thirds of all Georgia counties, and:  
♦ Orange County, Florida, where a computer crash prevented voter verification.37  
♦ Adams County, Colorado, where officials could not connect their laptop computers to the 
central voter registration database.38  
                                                          
34 Voters Turned Away After Waiting Hours. WPLG Local 10. November 1, 2004.  
http://www.local10.com/news/3878344/detail.html 
35 Voting problems minor, but frustrating. San Antonio Express. November 11, 2004. By Tracy Idell 
Hamilton, Staff Writer. http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/metro/stories/MYSA110204.online. 
votingproblems.1a8d060b.html; Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3650 
36 Parish by parish list of voter machine problems called in by viewers. WWLTV.com. 10:27 AM CST 
November 2, 2004. http://www.wwltv.com/local/stories/wwl110204electionmishap.18e9b314.html 
37 Few Glitches Reported in Early Fla. Voting. The State. October 19, 2004. By Jill Barton, Associated Press. 
http://www.thestate.com/mld/thestate/news/politics/9952991.htm 
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10) Memory Cards and Smart Card Encoders Fail 
Collin County, Texas. November 2004. Diebold DRE 39 
Flawed memory cards were sent to Canada to retrieve the data. 
Diebold touch screen voting machines locked up on election day. Election officials couldn't 
retrieve the results of the 63 ballots held on the memory card. County technicians couldn't 
retrieve the results. Diebold technicians in McKinney (home of Diebold Election Systems) 
couldn't retrieve the results. So the county sent the memory card to Diebold labs in Canada 
where technicians were able to get the totals.  
As the editorial points out, "The mere fact that a piece of Collin County's election record left the 
country should be cause for concern. " 
Volusia County, Florida. November 2004. Diebold Optical Scanner 
Memory cards were inspected in the summer, failed in the fall. 
Memory-card breakdowns in six machines left political contests in limbo for hours. The 
county had the memory cards inspected by Diebold in the summer of 2004 in preparation 
for the busy election season. Ion Sancho, the elections supervisor in Leon County, said 
officials with Diebold told him that the new, higher-capacity memory cards tend to have 
more glitches than older cards.40 
San Diego County, California. March 2004 Diebold Precinct Control Module 
Encoders allow multiple votes ... or none. 
At least one voter was able to vote twice on her "smart card," and at least 250 polls opened late 
because poll workers were unable to start up the encoders. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of 
people were turned away – many of them disenfranchised because they were unable to return to 
the polls at a later time that day. 41 Later reports estimated that this problem delayed the voting at 
40% of the polls and may have occurred at as many as 80% of the polling places.42  
While these problems were originally blamed on poll workers, a report43 released on April 12, 
2004 by Diebold Election Systems shows that 186 of 763 encoders failed on election day because 
of hardware or software problems or both, with only a minority of problems attributable to poll 
workers. Diebold also admitted that tabulation errors during the October recall election were due 
to software bugs. The following example shows that the problem has not yet been fixed. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
38 Early Voting Begins In Colorado. October 18, 2004. By Steven K. Paulson, Associated Press Writer. 
http://news4colorado.com/campaign2004/local_story_292161858.html 
39 Editorial: Put It on Paper — Election snafu points up problems for all-electronic voting. Dallas Morning 
News. November 11, 2004. http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/city/collin/ 
opinion/stories/111204dnccocollinvote.9eeb3.html 
40 Computer glitches slow Volusia results: County officials ask the machines' supplier to investigate why 
memory cards failed Tuesday. Orlando Sentinel. November 4, 2004. By Kevin P. Connolly, staff writer. 
Reproduced at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3694 
41 Poll workers, voters cite tied-up hotline, poor training, confusion.  
Union Tribune; March 7, 2004; By Jeff McDonald and Luis Monteagudo Jr.  
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/20040307-9999-1n7vote.html 
42 Correspondence, written report regarding Touchscreen voting system used for the first time March 2, 
2004 by the County of San Diego. From: Walter F. Ekard; Chief Administrative Officer 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/county/20040310-1315-report.html 
43 Diebold reports multiple problems: Registrar wants reason for e-voting. Tri-Valley Herald; April 13, 
2004; By Ian Hoffman, Staff Writer. http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.asp?id=1839 
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Twiggs County, Georgia. November 2004. Diebold Precinct Control Module  
Unexplained encoder problems.  
Twiggs County voters arrived at the polls today to find they could not cast their votes on 
the computerized voting machines. The voting machines were down in all five precincts 
this morning because of an encoder problem from 7 a.m. until about 9 a.m., according to 
Twiggs Chief Registrar Linda Polk.44  
Other Electronic-Election Phenomena 
Many other strange phenomena have occurred in the electronic equipment used for elections. A 
few examples are presented below.  
1) Election Officials Provide a Default Presidential Candidate 
Travis County. Texas. October 2004. Hart Intercivic DRE  
A "default" selection is a selection automatically pre-set by the software. It remains selected 
unless the user specifically chooses to change it. To provide a default selection on a DRE voting 
machine is to give a voter a ballot with a candidate already marked.  
Yet, election officials in Austin set up the eSlate DREs with Bush/Cheney as the default choice for 
president/vice-president. Voters who voted a straight party Democratic ticket watched their 
presidential votes changed to Bush on the review screen. Officials said voters caused this by 
pressing the wrong button on the second screen of the eSlate machine.  
Gail Fisher, manager of the county's Elections Division, theorizes that after selecting their 
straight party vote, some voters are going to the next page on the electronic ballot and 
pressing "enter," perhaps thinking they are pressing "cast ballot" or "next page." Since 
the Bush/Cheney ticket is the first thing on the page, it is highlighted when the page 
comes up – and thus, pressing "enter" at that moment causes the Kerry/Edwards vote to 
be changed to Bush/Cheney. 45 
2) Totals Dip into the Negative Numbers 
Mahoning County, Ohio. November 2004. ES&S DRE 
Sixteen of the county's 312 precincts experienced problems on election day. Some of the machines 
malfunctioned, others had malfunctioning "personal electronic ballot cartridges" which are 
placed into the machines before each vote to give the voter a ballot and record the votes.  
When some of the races showed total votes of negative 25 million in five or six precincts, 
Mahoning County Board of Elections blamed it on errors by the precinct officials' failing to follow 
protocol.46  
                                                          
44 Twiggs voters face problems at polls. The Courier Herald. November 2, 2004. By Jason Hobbs. 
Reproduced at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3647 
45 County Responds to Voting Machine Problems. Austin Chronicle. October 22, 2004. By Lee Nichols. 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/issues/dispatch/2004-10-22/pols_feature18.html 
46 Errors plague voting process in Ohio, Pa. Vindicator. November 3, 2004. Vindicator staff. 
http://www.vindy.com/basic/news/281829446390855.php 
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3) Voters Cast Non-Existent Ballots 
Honolulu, Hawaii. September 2004. Hart Intercivic DRE. 
New eSlate electronic voting machines allowed voters to choose a Green Party ballot, even 
though there were no Green Party candidates. The error disenfranchised 22 voters. 
State elections officials said the computerized voting machines provided by Hart Intercivic 
allowed voters to "click on" a political party, even though there weren't any candidates 
running from that party on their island.  
So a couple of dozen Green Party ballots were recorded, even though there were no 
candidates. 
"We brought that up to the vendor already. They will change that for the next election," 
[elections spokesman Rex] Quidilla said.47  
4) DREs Require Voters To Scroll Through The Ballot Backwards  
Mercer County, Pennsylvania. November, 2004. Unilect Patriot DRE.  
Many problems plagued the Unilect Patriot touch screens in Mercer County, even though they 
had passed the pre-election testing. Mercer County's director of elections admitted that a 
computer software "glitch" caused touch-screen voting machines to malfunction in about a dozen 
precincts. Article excerpts with highlighting added:  
"I don't know what happened," said James Bennington, who had been assured Friday 
that all 250 of the county's touch-screen units had been checked and rechecked. 
The county has 100 voting precincts.  
Keith Jenkins, director of the county's computer department, agreed that it was a 
software malfunction and said repeated calls to UniLect Corp., the company that sold the 
machines to the county in 2001, failed to resolve the problem.  
Precincts in Hermitage, Farrell, Wheatland, West Middlesex, Shenango Township and 
Sharon experienced the most serious machine difficulties, some from the moment the 
polls opened at 7 a.m. Some machines never operated, some offered only black 
screens and some required voters to vote backwards, starting on the last page of 
the touch-screen system and working back to the front page.48  
5) Report Shows 300 Registered Voters For Every Precinct in One County 
LaPorte County, Indiana. November 2004. ES&S reporting system  
A software flaw in the reporting system showed 300 registered voters in every precinct. Since the 
column that gives the turnout depends on the registration numbers, the county had to wait for a 
software patch from ES&S before they could determine voter turnout.49  
                                                          
47 Primary Election Runs Into Problems. HITV 4. The Hawaii Channel. September 24, 2004. 
http://www.thehawaiichannel.com/news/3760175/detail.html 
48 Errors plague voting process in Ohio, Pa. Vindicator. November 3, 2004. Vindicator staff. 
http://www.vindy.com/basic/news/281829446390855.php 
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49 Voter turnout still not known. Herald Argus. November 4, 2004. By Kori Kamradt, County Reporter. 
http://www.heraldargus.com/content/story.php?storyid=5304 
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Election 2004 
A Partial List of Incidents Reported in the News 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Grays Harbor Co. WA. 
ES&S Unity election 
management system 
added votes to the 
totals. [1] 
Snohomish Co. WA. 
Votes changed to the 
opponent on Sequoia 
touch screens. [2] 
Nye Co. NV. Sequoia  
e-voting machines  
had mis-feeds and  
printer jams. [3] 
Sacramento, CA. Nine 
of 712 precinct optical 
scanners broke down, 
had to be replaced. [4] 
Utah Co. UT Punch card 
tabulators failed to count 
33,000 votes. [5] 
Sandoval Co. NM  
Votes changed to the 
opponent on Sequoia 
touch screens.  [6] 
Bernalillo Co. NM Votes 
changed to the opponent 
on the Sequoia touch 
screens. [7] 
Boulder Co. CO. Hart/ 
Intercivic optical scanners 
failed to read several 
thousand ballots.  [8] 
Lancaster Co. NE 
ES&S scanners 
detected some 
ballots twice. [9] 
Sarpy Co. NE ES&S Unity 
software added 10,000 
phantom votes. [10] 
Wichita Co. TX. ES&S 
software failed to 
record 6,900 of 
26,000 votes for 
president.  [11] 
Travis Co. TX. Pressing 
"Enter" after a straight-Dem 
vote changes vote to Bush 
on eSlate machines. [12] 
Collin Co. TX. Diebold 
touch screens locked 
up, wouldn't release 
vote data.  [13] 
Four Parishes in LA. 
Sequoia machines 
malfunctioned in 
over a dozen 
precincts.  [14] 
Pike Co. AR. 
Optical scanner 
failed to count 
692 of 4,083 
votes. [15] 
Franklin Co. IN Fidlar 
tabulators gave straight-
party Democrat votes to 
Libertarians in 9 precincts. 
[16] 
Mahoning Co. OH 20 to 30 ES&S e-
voting machines registered votes for 
the opponent. [17] 
AND One precinct reported negative 
25 million votes. [18] 
Franklin Co. OH 
Danaher e-voting 
machine gave 
Bush 3,893 extra 
votes. [19] 
Mercer Co. PA Unilect 
machines displayed ballot 
pages in the wrong order.  
[20] 
AND recorded 51 pres. 
votes for 289 voters. [21] 
Maryland. Diebold 
touch screens 
registered votes 
incorrectly, skipped 
pages on the ballot. 
[22]
Lexington Co. SC.
Officials couldn't retrieve
200 ballots from an ES&S
e-voting machine. [25] Orange & Broward Co. FL. 
Totals reached 32,767 & 
ES&S software began 
subtracting votes. [24] 
Palm Beach
Co. FL.
Sequoia  touch
screens lost 37
votes. [23]
Carteret Co. NC.
Unilect e-voting
machine lost
4,400 votes.
[30]
Craven Co. NC.
ES&S software
doubled the
totals in nine
of the 26
precincts. [29]
Guilford Co. NC. Totals
reached 32,767 and ES&S
software began subtracting
votes. [28]
Twiggs Co. GA. Diebold touch 
screens were down in all five 
precincts when polls opened. [26] 
Mecklenburg Co. NC. 
MicroVote e-voting 
machines report 
106,064 votes  
for 102,109  
voters. [27] 
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Words from Experts 
Many state and local election officials insist that their election equipment is accurate and reliable 
because it has passed a rigorous testing and certification process before it is used in an election.  
Chapter 2 has demonstrated that the process is severely inadequate. Consider also the response 
of Dr. Douglas Jones50 to a radio commentator's assertion that if we can design computerized 
aircraft, we should be able to design computerized voting systems.  
The standard rule of thumb for software development in avionics is that you spend 10 times 
as much of your money on testing and certification as you spend on product development. 
The voting systems arena is nowhere like that. There's no parallel there at all. 
The absurdity of trusting the current testing and certification process is made abundantly clear in 
the testimony of Dr. Michael I. Shamos before the Environment, Technology, and Standards 
Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Science on June 24, 2004.51  
I am here today to offer my opinion that the system we have for testing and certifying 
voting equipment in this country is not only broken, but is virtually nonexistent.  
It must be re-created from scratch or we will never restore public confidence in elections. 
It is noteworthy that the remarks of Dr. Shamos reflect the consensus of the experts at the 
hearing: Carolyn Coggins, Director of ITA Services at one of the independent labs that test voting 
equipment; Dr. Hratch G. Semerjian, Acting Director of the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology; Thomas R. Wilkey, Former Executive Director of the New York State Board Of 
Elections and Chair of the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED) Voting 
Systems Board.  
During the questioning period, Congressman Vernon Ehlers asked Dr. Shamos, "What can be 
done to improve these processes before the 2004 election?" Dr. Shamos replied: 
I do not believe that Congress can act meaningfully in the 130 days that remain before the 
2004 election. Even if it could, the states would be powerless to comply in so short a time.  
No one present disagreed.52  
                                                          
50 Dr. Jones is an Associate Professor of Computer Science at the University of Iowa, has served on the Iowa 
Board of Examiners for Voting Machines and Electronic Voting Systems since 1994, and has consulted 
with the ACLU (Illinois Chapter), Miami-Dade County, and the Brennan Center for Justice on voting 
related issues.    
51 Testimony of Michael I. Shamos before the Environment, Technology, and Standards Subcommittee of 
the U.S. House of Representatives’ Committee on Science. June 24, 2004. (highlighting added) 
http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/ets04/jun24/shamos.pdf 
 Dr. Shamos is the Co-Director of the Institute for eCommerce at Carnegie Mellon University. He has 
served as an examiner of electronic voting systems and consultant on electronic voting to Pennsylvania, 
Nevada, and Delaware. He is a strong proponent of paperless systems. 
52 Watch the Webcast at http://www.house.gov/science/webcast/index.htm 
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A Look at the Current Process 
 
 
Electronic Equipment: Testing, Certification, and Election Administration 
In his testimony to the Congressional Subcommittee, referenced on the previous page, Dr. 
Shamos gave a concise overview of the testing and certification process and the problems. 
Excerpts from his testimony are included through the following sections (all highlighting is 
added).  
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Inadequacy of the Standards 
Most states have laws or administrative rules that require election systems to be "qualified" by 
NASED53 before they can be certified for use in the state. In the qualification process, an 
Independent Testing Authority (ITA), approved by NASED, tests voting equipment against the 
voluntary Federal Voting System Standards approved by the Federal Election Commission and 
more recently the Election Assistance Commission established by HAVA.  
If the system meets or exceeds the standards, the system is placed on the list of NASED 
"Qualified" machines and is assigned a NASED qualification number. Hardware and software are 
tested separately by different ITAs and are assigned separate NASED numbers. If any changes 
are made to a system, the vendor must apply anew.  
Dr. Shamos' comments on the standard against which the ITA's test voting equipment:  
The process of “qualification” is testing to determine whether a particular model of voting 
system meets appropriate national standards. Unfortunately, no such standards currently 
even exist. The Federal Voting System Standards (FVSS), formerly known as the FEC 
Standards, are incomplete and out of date. 
For example, one of the principal election security worries is the possibility of a computer 
virus infecting a voting system. Yet the FVSS place virus responsibility on the voting 
system vendor and do not provide for any testing by the Independent Testing Authority 
(ITA). ... It is hardly reassuring to have the fox guarantee the safety of the chickens.  
Nearly all voting machines currently in use have been tested against the 1990 standards — not 
even the current 2002 standards, which Dr. Shamos calls "incomplete and out of date."54  To add 
perspective, in 1990 the 486 microprocessor was state-of-the-art, only a few people had heard of 
the Internet, and the Windows operating system, which many qualified voting systems now use, 
did not yet exist.  
Secrecy of the Qualification Process 
According to the NASED description of the qualification process: 
The ITAs will not respond to outside inquiries about the testing process for voting 
systems, nor will they answer questions related to a specific manufacturer or a specific 
voting system. All such inquiries are to be directed to The Election Assistance 
Commission on behalf of NASED.55  
The testing and qualification process is conducted under a confidential contract between the ITA 
and the vendor applying for qualification. The process is kept secret from election officials, the 
media, and the general public. Vendors contact the ITAs to enter the testing process; all contracts 
and contacts about the process are directly between the vendor and the ITA. All inquiries about 
the process must be directed to the EAC, and the EAC is responsible for the coordination among 
the FEC, NASED, jurisdictions, and the ITAs. 
                                                          
53 National  Association of State Election Directors  
54 NASED Qualified Voting Systems. 12/05/03 – Current. 
http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDQualifiedVotingSystems12-03-12-04.pdf 
55 National Association of State Election Directors General Overview for Getting a Voting System 
Qualified. Page 5. http://www.nased.org/ITA%20Information/NASEDITAProcess.pdf  
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Dr. Shamos' comments on the qualification process:  
Even if there were suitable standards, it is a significant question how to assure the public 
that a particular machine meets them. The current process of qualification testing by 
Independent Testing Authorities certified by the National Association of State Election 
Directors (NASED) is dysfunctional. As proof I need only cite the fact that the voting 
systems about which security concerns have recently been raised, such as Diebold 
Accuvote, were all ITA-qualified. Some of these systems contain security holes so 
severe that one wonders what the ITA was looking for during its testing.  
One may wonder, but one cannot find out. The ITA procedures are entirely opaque. ... I 
find it grotesque that an organization charged with such a heavy responsibility feels no 
obligation to explain to anyone what it is doing.   
It is important to note that the ITAs test a machine's design against the federal standards. There 
is no process (except perhaps the vendors') for testing and qualifying individual machines. So, 
while a design may be qualified, the individual machines used in elections are not.  
State Certification — Seeing if the Functions are There 
Certification is performed by the states and involves checking the functionality to make sure that 
it meets the state's needs, for example, the ability to do candidate rotation on the ballot, to allow 
cross-over voting, or to perform other functions required by state law.  
Dr. Shamos' comments on the state certification process:  
The existence of Federal standards and ITAs has actually had a counterproductive effect. 
Many states that formerly had statutory certification procedures have abdicated them in 
favor of requiring no more from a vendor than an ITA qualification letter, and in some 
cases even less. Alabama, for example, requires no certification at all but relies on a 
written guarantee by the vendor that its system satisfies the state’s requirements. My own 
state, Pennsylvania, abandoned certification in 2002 because it believed the ITA process 
was sufficient. We are less safe in 2004 than we were 20 years ago.  
Trusting that the NASED qualification means the product is suitable for use in elections, most 
state certification teams do nothing to ensure that the equipment meets federal standards. They 
do nothing to check the software for viruses or malicious code. They do not examine its security 
features. They do not understand its internal workings; they cannot, since trade secret laws 
prohibit them.  
The Myth of Pre-Election Testing 
Most localities are required to perform Logic and Accuracy (L&A) testing on every voting 
machine before every election. For example, in California: 
At every election, all voting equipment is required to be tested by the local elections 
official conducting the election. This testing includes "Logic and Accuracy" testing, a 
process during which voting equipment is tested with a known number of votes and must 
produce exactly that result in order to be certified for use in the election. 56  
Pre-election testing is conducted at the county level. Its primary purpose is to ensure that the 
software has been set up properly to accurately count the specific ballots for that election. It is 
notable that election administrators receive no training in software or hardware testing, yet they 
are responsible for testing not only the software but also the interaction between software and the 
mechanical devices on which the software is installed.  
                                                          
56 Major Issues And Questions Addressed By The Task Force. California Ad Hoc Task Force; March 2003 
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce_report_2.htm 
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Dr. Shamos' comments on pre-election testing: 
The machines may work according to specification but if they have not been loaded with 
the appropriate set of ballot styles to be used in a polling place they will be completely 
ineffective.  
The ballot styles to which Dr. Shamos refers are constructed through a process called "ballot 
programming." Ballot programming is done uniquely for each election; it produces a ballot 
definition file (BDF). BDFs are unique for each election; they define all the contests and 
candidates for each precinct. Data in the files tell the underlying voting machine software how to 
interpret a voter's touches on a screen or marks on an optical scan ballot (including absentee 
ballots) and how to record those selections as votes. In other words, BDFs turn votes into 
electronic vote data. BDFs are the primary focus of the testing that county officials do before each 
election.  
As Dr. Shamos indicated, the BDF is a key component of the voting system, yet it is never 
subjected to an outside review. The lack of independent oversight of these files is a major security 
vulnerability. If BDFs are incorrectly prepared, the wrong candidate could be elected.  
Programming election data is a very complex process, especially in counties with hundreds of 
different ballot styles. Some election districts lack the technical expertise to prepare BDFs, and 
instead depend on the vendor or outside programmers for the preparation. Others prepare the 
BDFs themselves. In both cases, however, BDFs undergo minimal testing and no independent 
audit before being used to determine the results of an election. Little wonder that many serious 
election disruptions have been caused by ballot definition errors. Since such errors are initially 
noticed because of suspect results, it is highly likely that other BDF errors have gone unnoticed. 
Some may have affected election outcomes.  
All of the proven ballot definition errors occurred on optical scan equipment and were caught by 
a manual recount of the ballots. In Chapter 2, "Election-Specific Programming Miscounts Votes" 
on page 9 gives three examples from the 2004 general election. Here are five examples from 
previous elections:  
♦ In New Mexico, 67,000 absentee and early-voting ballots were counted incorrectly. 57  
♦ In Texas, a difference in ballot data on different machines resulted in miscounts in 18 races.58 
♦ In Florida, 2,642 Democratic and Republican votes were counted as Republican.59  
♦ In Texas, victories for two commissioners were initially given to the wrong candidates.60 
♦ In North Carolina, 5,500 party-line votes, both Republican and Democrat, were uncounted.61 
                                                          
57 Human error is cause of N.M. election glitch. Government Computer News; November 20, 2000; Vol. 19 
No. 33. http://www.gcn.com/vol19_no33/news/3307-1.html 
58 Glitch affects 18 races   Problems in counting early votes could alter some election outcomes. Dallas 
Morning News. May 8, 2002. Ed Housewright, staff writer.  
59 6/2/04 Conversation with Barbara Montpetit, Supervisor of Elections. Original reference was from Black 
Box Voting, Chapter 2. “Sometimes the old ways are best.” The Bradenton Herald, 17 September 2002. 
60 06/03/04. Conversation with Scurry County Elections Director, who said the problem was caused by the 
ES&S 650 chip with the ballot programming on it, and that they had to get a new one from ES&S. Original 
reference was from Black Box Voting, Chapter 2. Houston Chronicle, 8 November 2002; “Ballot glitches 
reverse two election results” 
61 Winners' may be losers. The News and Observer; November 12, 2002; By Wade Rawlins and Rob 
Christensen. Reproduced at: http://66.102.7.104/search?q=cache:iy0f4rgd7oMJ:www.ncdot.org/news/ 
dailyclips/2002-11-12zz.html+%22%27Winners%27+may+be+losers%22+wayne&hl=en 
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Since DREs (paperless electronic voting machines) provide no way to conduct an independent 
audit of the results, BDF errors on DREs are virtually undetectable. Given the known problems 
with BDFs on optical scan voting systems, it is reasonable to assume that similar but undetected 
errors have also occurred with DREs.  
♦  January 2004, Broward County, Florida.62 The 134 blank ballots recorded by DREs are still 
unexplained. Did 134 voters go to the polls, with only one contest on the ballot, and cast 
blank ballots as election officials assume, or did a BDF error cause votes to be lost as has 
happened on optical scan machines?  
♦ November 2002, Georgia. Dramatic upsets in the races for Governor and U.S. Senator could 
not be investigated because the voting machines were DREs. The outcomes may have been 
correct, but how do we know the BDF was not flawed? 
If BDFs are flawed, a hand recount of the original ballots is the only way to correct the results. 
When optical scan ballots are recounted by the machine (by running them through the optical 
scanner a second time), the results typically match the initial tally. But while odd results might 
suggest a flaw in the BDF of a paperless system, even if further testing proved the flaw, there 
would be no way to recover the intent of the voters. 
Accurate election results require accurate BDFs. Some counties have hundreds of ballot styles, 
and each one must be programmed correctly since a human error in any definition could be 
magnified by the number of voters using that ballot.  
Pre-election testing is completely inadequate. Optical scanners are tested by running a small set 
of test ballots —hardly enough to test every possible combination for every ballot style. Testing 
on DREs may involve simply pressing each button on the screen to make sure they all work 
correctly. Testing has failed to detect the many election data errors that have disrupted many 
optical scan elections. If an error occurs during an election, a new BDF is created and used to tally 
the final result, but without a manual audit of the votes, there is no way of knowing if the new 
BDF is correct. It could simply give results that are within reason and therefore unquestioned.  
The extreme complexity of election definition data, the complete lack of security procedures used 
to create them, the hopelessly inadequate testing: these problems raise serious questions about 
the accuracy of electronic vote counting — on both DREs and optical scanners.  
The Realities of Conducting Logic & Accuracy (L&A) Testing on DREs 
In Jefferson County, Washington, the only electronic voting equipment is a single central-count 
optical scan machine. The county auditor's office spends as long as eight hours preparing the test 
plan and filling out the ballots that will be used for the test. Then the test, which is performed in 
public, takes about an hour. Once the test is completed, all the tested components are stored in a 
box locked with a security device until the election.  
The importance of the L&A testing is undisputed, as a snafu in Bernardino County, California 
demonstrated:  
In November 2001, the failure of Registrar of Voters managers to fully perform logic testing 
on the computer coding for the ballot counting machines resulted in votes for some 
candidates going to other candidates. All 82 elections were subjected to a hand recount, with 
the results in 13 local water and school board races overturned. Registrar Ingrid Gonzales 
resigned months later.63 
                                                          
62 Electronic vote recount stumps Broward officials. Sun-Sentinel; January 10 2004; By Jeremy Milarsky  
and Lisa J. Huriash, Staff Writers  
63 Ballot counting resumes in San Bernardino County after four-hour delay.  
The Press-Enterprise; March 3, 2004; By Sharon McNary. 
http://www.pe.com/breakingnews/local/stories/PE_News_Local_websnafu03.9ff35.html 
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In a county with multiple DREs at each polling place, the time and effort required for adequate 
L&A testing increases significantly. For example, to comply with California law, the Registrar of 
San Diego County must test 10,200 DREs before every election. If it took an hour to test one DRE, 
San Diego County would have to spend 1275 person-days testing before every election.  
In addition, securing the tested components until election day becomes a significant challenge, 
and, in fact, the components in San Diego were not secured before the March 2004 primary 
election. They were sent home with poll workers after the training sessions, and the poll workers 
transported them to the polling places.64 
The following information is adapted from the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility 
(CPSR) description of testing DREs: 65 
Each "ballot" of a logic and accuracy test for a DRE must be entered into the DRE by 
hand –  by voting the test ballot on the DRE itself. DREs present two special problems for 
logic and accuracy testing:  
1. The process is time-consuming, so a small number of ballots is used – often too 
small to catch important mistakes. Thus, in order to minimize the cost associated with 
testing, the effectiveness of the testing may be sacrificed.  
2. It is difficult to correctly generate a series of test ballots on a DRE without a single 
error. It is much more likely that an election worker will make a mistake in entering 
test ballots than that an actual voter will make such a mistake, because the voter only 
has to remember one set of votes: the votes they wish to make. The DRE tester has 
a much more difficult problem. Consequently, election workers must conduct DRE 
logic and accuracy tests with extreme deliberation and caution, as even a single error 
requires that the entire logic and accuracy test be repeated. In practice, this results 
in logic and accuracy tests that are smaller yet, to the point where the test is 
testing for little besides a stuck button or a completely nonfunctional DRE. 
Consequently many DRE counties use the automated tests provided by the vendor, but these 
tests do not simulate election-day voting, nor do they run through the same program code used 
in a live election.  
If DREs Fail the L&A Test ... 
While many states provide for pre-election testing of machines, in the event of a large-
scale failure they can find themselves without enough working machines to conduct an 
election.  Dr. Michael I. Shamos 
Ideally, every L&A test would show that the machines are operating correctly. However, there is 
a possibility that one or more machines could fail. Consider the ramifications of having the tests 
on even one DRE show that it was losing ballots or recording votes incorrectly.  
♦ It would be necessary to take the machine out of service or have it repaired.  
♦ If the software appeared to be flawed, the flaw would be present in all DREs using that same 
software, so all of them would have to be taken out of service or repaired.  
♦ It is likely that it would be too late to have a software patch developed, tested, certified, and 
installed in time for the election.  
                                                          
64 County ordered to offer voters paper ballots. 
North County Times; February 12, 2004; By Gig Conaughton, Staff Writer  
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/02/13/news/top_stories/2_12_0422_53_18.txt 
65 CPSR Comments on the California Touch Screen Task Force Report. August 1, 2003; Computer 
Professionals for Social Responsibility. http://www.cpsr.org/issues/vote-catouchscreen.html 
For information on the task force report, go to:  http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/taskforce.htm  
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♦ It is also likely that it would be too late to print paper ballots for the entire county to use for 
the election.  
♦ It might be necessary to use uncertified software and hope it isn't flawed. Forced into such a 
corner, several California counties used Diebold's uncertified Precinct Control Modules in the 
March 2004 primary election. Some results are described on page 12 of this document.  
How's it Working?  
For the answer, refer back to the 30 detailed examples in Chapter 2, or the sampling of problems 
shown on the map on page 15. Or read through the 125+ machine malfunctions briefly described 
in the Election 2004 problem log at VotersUnite.Org.66 Or browse through the files of 
malfunctions sorted by vendor.67 Virtually all of the systems referenced on these pages and in 
these files were NASED-qualified, state-certified, and subjected to pre-election testing.  
For example, in Lancaster County, Nebraska, two out of six qualified, certified, and fully tested 
optical scanners miscounted votes in the 2004 general election:  
When the officials began testing the six machines, it became clear that two were not 
correctly counting the ballots. "That came as a surprise, [County Election Commissioner 
David] Shively said, because all were tested late last week and performed well." 68 
In Pennsylvania's 2004 general election, too, the pre-election testing was to no avail:  
Mercer County's director of elections said it was a computer software glitch that caused 
touch-screen voting machines to malfunction in about a dozen precincts Tuesday. ... 
Election workers in Mercer County raced to take paper ballots to polling places in the 
Shenango Valley after a series of computer errors.  
"I don't know what happened," said James Bennington, who had been assured Friday 
that all 250 of the county's touch-screen units had been checked and rechecked.69 
Sometimes, however, the tests fail. But what happens next, at least in New Mexico, is up to the 
discretion of the election directors.  
In the 2004 primary election in Dona Ana County, New Mexico, optical scan machines failed the 
pre-election testing and were used in early voting anyway. In pre-election testing, counters that 
track the total number of ballots passed through the machine showed incorrect numbers. The 
counters in four out of five machines were incorrect, showing as many as 20 or 30 votes more 
than the actual number of ballots tested. Yet the machines were used in early-voting anyway.70 
 
                                                          
66 http://www.votersunite.org/electionproblems.asp 
67 http://www.votersunite.org/info/messupsbyvendor.asp 
68 Problem machines spur call for recount. Lincoln Journal Star. November 14, 2004. By Nate Jenkins. 
http://www.journalstar.com/articles/2004/11/14/election/doc4189b9c7f14bf764391458.txt 
69 Errors plague voting process in Ohio, Pa. Vindicator. November 3, 2004. Vindicator staff. 
http://www.vindy.com/basic/news/281829446390855.php 
70 Company denies problem with voting program. Clovis News Journal. June 3, 2004. By Jack King: CNJ 
Staff Writer. http://cnjonline.com/engine.pl?station=clovis&template=storyfull.html&id=6358 
I followed up with Susanna Martinez, the district attorney mentioned in the article. She provided the 
additional details in this description.  
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In addition to the security and accountability problems that others have documented in detail 
(see page 54), numerous other practical and operational problems result from the use of 
electronics in elections. Contrary to many election officials' hope that electronic voting will make 
elections run more smoothly and simplify election processes, electronics add a significant 
number of unfamiliar and unexpected complexities.  
Software Complexities 
A Word about Source Code and Programming 
While the vast majority of Americans use software programs, most of them know little about 
how the software is created. Since much of the debate surrounding electronic voting involves 
discussion of software, the following information is included for those unfamiliar with software.  
Many technologists are calling for open source code in voting machines. But election officials and 
legislators may not be clear on what source code is or why open source code is important.  
Source code is the list of instructions that cause the computer to display screens, record votes, 
tally votes, and perform all other functions both visible and invisible. So, for example, when the 
voter presses the VOTE button, that action triggers a list of instructions for the machine to follow 
internally. Currently, only the vendors know what those instructions are, and the courts have 
ruled that those instructions on how to handle votes are a trade secret. In other words, courts 
have decided that the competitive advantage that secret source code gives to the vendors has a 
higher priority than the right of the public to know how their votes are being counted.  
"Open" source code means the instructions would not be a secret. Anyone would be able to look 
at them. Although the instructions are written in programming language, and few election 
officials or legislators may be able to understand it, there are many programmers who would 
understand the language. Nevertheless, finding bugs by reading source code is not an easy task, 
especially when you consider that complex programs contain thousands, sometimes millions, of 
lines of instructions and are often not well documented.  
Here is an example of C++ source code that sorts a set of numbers. 
void Sort( INT* ItemArray, INT ArraySize ) 
{ 
    INT     Temp; 
    INT     i = 0; 
    INT     j = 0; 
    INT     Offset  = ArraySize; 
    BOOLEAN InOrder = FALSE; 
 
    do { 
        Offset  = ((8 * Offset) / 11) ; 
        Offset  = ((Offset == 0) ? 1 : Offset); 
        InOrder = TRUE; 
        for (i = 0, j = Offset; i < (ArraySize - Offset); i++, j++) { 
            if (ItemArray[i] > ItemArray[j]) { 
                InOrder = FALSE; 
                Temp = ItemArray[i]; 
                ItemArray[i] = ItemArray[j]; 
                ItemArray[j] = Temp; 
            } 
        } 
    } while (!( (Offset == 1) && (InOrder == TRUE) )); 
} 
Having secret source code is 
comparable to having vendors write up 
the procedures they use to count ballots 
and then refusing to show anyone -- 
even legislators and election 
administrators -- what those procedures 
are. And then allowing the vendors to 
go into a locked room, carry out those 
secret procedures, and return to public 
view only to announce the results of the 
election.  
Having open source code is comparable 
to having vendors show everyone the 
procedures they wrote up, and then 
allowing them to go into a locked room, 
carry out those procedures without 
anyone watching, and return to 
announce the final results. 
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ES&S iVotronic — Case Study of a Tiny Programming Bug 
All software has bugs, but the opportunity to examine a bug in voting software is rare. 
Fortunately, we had a chance after a news article was published May 13, 2004 telling about a 
"serious bug" found by Orlando Suarez in Miami-Dade's ES&S election equipment nearly a year 
earlier. ES&S had known about this serious bug for nearly a year and had not fixed it.71  
The audit log and the vote image report are unreliable. For example, the audit log failed to report 
machines at the precinct and reported "phantom" machines instead. It assigned votes from the 
missing machines to the "phantom." The vote image report failed to report machines AND failed 
to report votes. Suarez says:  
In my humble opinion (and based on my over 30 years of experience in the information 
technology field)," Suarez wrote, "I believe that there is/are a serious 'bug' in the 
program(s) that generate these reports making these reports unusable for the purpose 
that we were considering (audit an election, recount an election and if necessary, use 
these reports to certify an election). 
With the help of Miami-Dade County and Dr. Douglas Jones, a University of Iowa computer 
science professor who serves on the Iowa Board of Examiners for voting machines, ES&S 
discovered two interacting bugs that show up when the battery is low.  
We'll just look at the first bug72 — two lines of source code were in the wrong order. This may 
seem like a 'small' bug, but consider how important it is to give instructions in the correct order. 
For example:  
1. Jump off the bridge.  
2. Tie the bungi cord around your feet.  
Here's what happens to trigger the ES&S iVotronic bug:  
1 
 
The battery voltage is too low.  
The battery might have run down, or it might have been defective in the 
first place.  
2 
 
A low-battery message is written to the memory inside the iVotronic.  
This is normal. The iVotronic tracks all events, including "low-battery" 
events.  
3 
 
Here's the bug: The software writes the "low-battery" message 
BEFORE it moves to a new, blank space in the memory.  
So, the low-battery message overwrites the previous event message, 
causing the data to be garbled. Fortunately, they tell us, this bug doesn't 
overwrite any vote records, just event log records.  
Simply reversing the order of the instructions fixed the bug. Similarly, when a vendor makes a 
"small upgrade" to voting software, it could wreak havoc with the operation of the system.  
                                                          
71 Count Crisis? Elections official warns of glitches that may scramble vote auditing. Miami Daily 
Business Review. May 13, 2004. By Matthew Haggman. http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1084316008117 
72 For details about both bugs and their interaction, go to http://www.votersunite.org/info/auditbug.asp 
4  Election Complexities Increased by Electronic Voting 27 
Safeguarding Votes: Paper vs. Electronic Data 
Electronic records and paper records are comparable in one way — they are both information. 
After that, the similarities quickly disappear.  
Recording data We can record information directly onto a paper record, but we can only 
record electronic data indirectly with the assistance of a computer program 
that interprets what we mean and records it in a language the computer can 
understand. 
Viewing data  We can view information on paper records directly, but we can only view 
electronic data indirectly with the assistance of a computer program that reads 
the data for us and presents it to us in our own language.  
Changing data Electronic records can be altered by any of the following methods. Paper 
records cannot.  
♦ Passing a magnet above the physical medium holding the data.  
♦ Sending a command through the phone lines.  
♦ Sending a command through electrical lines.  
♦ Sending a command via wireless communications, such as a cell phone.  
Electronic records can be altered undetectably — by someone in the next room 
or a thousand miles away— while paper records cannot.  
Size of data Electronic records have almost no size at all compared to paper records. Data 
for thousands of ballots will fit on a cartridge the size of a credit card. The 
same number of paper ballots would fill a grocery bag or two.  
One aspect of a computerized voting system has no easy equivalent in the world of paper ballots: 
the counting process itself. Not only is the vote data electronic, but the counting process is also.  
This means that election directors' procedures developed to safeguard and count paper ballots 
cannot be fully translated into procedures for safeguarding and counting electronic vote data. In 
fact, election directors have no procedures for counting electronic data. All those procedures 
are electronic processes contained in the software; they are trade secrets of the election equipment 
vendors.  
Complexities that Make Government Oversight a Myth 
Officials Cannot Oversee the Vote-Counting Process in Electronic Elections 
Election officials cannot oversee what they cannot see. Election officials who use software to 
count and tally votes have given up control of those processes to the programmers who encoded 
the software. Legislatures that allow the use of electronic equipment without mandating manual 
audits of the election results are giving programmers control of the election processes.  
♦ In optical scan and punch card voting systems, votes are counted by software processes that 
courts have declared to be trade secrets of the election equipment manufacturers.  
♦ In DRE systems, not only are votes counted by the secret software processes, but the votes 
are also recorded by secret processes.  
♦ In all these systems, election management software is used to accumulate the votes into the 
final results. Unless the accumulation software has been developed by the state (as it has in 
Oklahoma), the accumulation processes are also trade secrets.  
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Furthermore, while county officials have always overseen registration and voter sign-in books in 
the past, registration is becoming computerized, in some cases outsourced to private companies. 
Election Directors Rely on Vendor Technicians During Elections 
Generally, election officials have experience in election administration and have no background 
or expertise in software. Since administering an electronic election requires a great deal of 
technical expertise and knowledge of the software used in the election, election officials across 
the country must rely on assistance from vendors. 
Even those rare election officials who have an in-depth understanding of software do not — and 
by court rulings, are not allowed to — have an in-depth understanding of the software they use 
to conduct elections.  
While election officials take an oath to uphold the integrity of the election, vendors do not.  
Because of election officials' unfamiliarity with the election equipment they are using, vendor 
technicians are involved in virtually every aspect of elections. They are often unsupervised, and 
election officials trust them implicitly. Since they contract to do work that election officials do not 
have the experience to do, they always work without the informed oversight of the officials.  
"A common practice for local election officials is to let election companies run 
their election — make up their ballot, set up their machines, and even count their 
tallies. This is a dangerous practice."  
 ~ Ted Selker, Cal Tech/MIT Voting Technology Project. 73 
♦ Vendor technicians frequently do the ballot programming, which determines how marks 
on a paper ballot or touches on a screen are translated into electronic vote data.74  
Carroll County, North Carolina. November, 2004. A ballot programming error by ES&S 
caused the ballots to be counted incorrectly. ES&S will supply a new chip for the Model 
115 optical scanners and the county will rescan the ballots. 75 
                                                          
73 Touch to Vote: More Americans to Vote on Electronic, Touch-Screen Systems in November. ABC News. 
July 18, 2004.  http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/WNT/Politics/e-voting_040718-2.html 
74 An ES&S representative told me that ES&S does ballot programming for 1200 counties in the U.S.  
75 Computer glitch blamed for miscount in JP voting. Star Tribune. November 10, 2004. By Anna Mathews, 
CCN staff writer. http://www.greenforesttribune.com/articles/2004/11/10/news/s1.txt 
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♦ Vendor technicians even reprogram ballots directly from the county's equipment.  
Miami Dade County, Florida. April 2002. An ES&S technician opened the ballot program 
on the memory cards to change a header. At the same time, he bumped the first 
candidate to the last position. "When the technician saved the edit, a prompt most likely 
popped up on the monitor asking him if he was sure he wanted to change the order of 
the names. The technician ignored the prompt and confirmed the change."76  
♦ Vendor technicians test and prepare the equipment for the elections.  
Napa County, California. March 2004. "Prior to the election, a Sequoia technician ran test 
ballots through the machine to calibrate its reading sensitivity, but failed to test for gel 
ink."77 
♦ Vendor technicians provide technical supervision during an election.  
San Diego County, California. March 2004. Diebold provided 200 "Rovers" who were 
each assigned to monitor a set of polling places in their designated area. 78 
♦ Vendors release election results to the media.  
Walker County, Georgia. March 2004. "A Diebold computer technician began providing 
incorrect numbers to news organizations. The botched returns were fed to the media for 
more than two hours after the polls closed before the problem was corrected." 79 
♦ Vendor technicians retrieve data from memory cards.  
Collin County, Texas. November 2004. When election officials could not retrieve the 
results of the 63 ballots held on a Diebold memory card, they sent the card to Diebold 
experts in Canada, who retrieved the data.80 Memory cards are electronic ballot boxes. 
So, a ballot box was mailed to Canada, violating all chain-of-custody procedures. 
♦ Vendor technicians investigate when election equipment breaks down.  
Snohomish County, Washington. September 2004. Twenty touch-screen voting machines 
broke down during the primary. Sequoia technicians spent a week in Everett testing the 
machines that broke down, as well as the ones that did not. They did not uncover the 
cause of the problem. 81 
                                                          
76 Technician's Error, Not Machines, To Blame In Dade Election Mix-Up. The Miami Herald. April 4, 2002. 
By Oscar Corral. [Purchase through Miami Herald online archives: 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/archives/] 
77 Lost E-Votes Could Flip Napa Race. Wired News; March 15, 2004; By Kim Zetter. 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,62655,00.html 
78 Correspondence, written report regarding Touchscreen voting system used for the first time March 2, 
2004 by the County of San Diego. 
From: Walter F. Ekard; Chief Administrative Officer 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/county/20040310-1315-report.html 
79 Ballot card problems delayed election returns (Georgia). Walker County Messenger; March 4, 2004; Eric 
Beavers. Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=1417 
80 Editorial: Put It on Paper — Election snafu points up problems for all-electronic voting. Dallas Morning 
News. November 11, 2004. http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/ 
news/city/collin/opinion/stories/111204dnccocollinvote.9eeb3.html 
81 20 voting machines broke down. Everett Herald. October 6, 2004. By Jerry Cornfield, Herald Writer.  
http://www.heraldnet.com/stories/04/10/06/loc_voting001.cfm 
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♦ Vendor technicians troubleshoot and supervise file management activities on the central 
tabulator during an election.  
Morris County, New Jersey. June 2004. The tabulation system was unable to read the 
data from the touch screen machines because the C drive was full. The vice-president of 
Sequoia led County Clerk Joan Bramhall's technicians through a process that deleted 
unnecessary information on the drive and "refreshed" the computer. Then they were able 
to read the cartridges.82 
♦ Vendor technicians, unsupervised and unquestioned, repair election equipment. 
Santa Clara County, California. November 2003. Following the election, Sequoia sent 
over a group of technicians to make adjustments to voting machines that experienced 
battery problems. For three weeks, the workers, employed by a Sequoia subcontractor, 
took apart the machines, removing their circuit boards and making adjustments. 
Santa Clara County officials didn't know the name of the subcontractor and hadn't 
verified the identities of the workers it hired when the San Jose Mercury News made an 
inquiry. They also hadn't documented the changes being made to the machines. 
To find out such information, "you'd have to contact Sequoia," said Assistant Registrar of 
Voters Elaine Larson.83 
♦ Vendor representatives have even been known to conduct entire elections.  
Greenwood County, South Carolina. August 2004. "As part of the federal grant 
agreement, ES&S will conduct the county’s first election using the iVotronic, said 
Connie Moody, director of voter registration and elections for Greenwood County. The 
equipment will not go into use until November, she said, when county election staff 
functions mostly as observers and consultants."84 
Lack of Information about Malfunctions Handicaps Election Officials 
Equipment problems that occur in one county are rarely communicated to other counties using 
that same equipment. This lack of information about their equipment limits the ability of election 
officials to administer their elections effectively. Sometimes it is simply because no 
communication mechanism is in place to allow election officials to share information easily.  
For example, in March of 2004, Indiana officials discovered that ES&S had — in violation of state 
law — installed uncertified, unauthorized software in touch-screen voting machines used by 
three Indiana counties in the previous November's election. The Board of Elections demanded 
that the systems be restored to the earlier version, which was certified.  
Because I had previously researched a machine malfunction in Wake County, North Carolina, I 
knew that the certified version was the predecessor to the version that had failed so miserably in 
Wake County in 2002.85 So, it was almost a sure bet that it would fail in Indiana as well. I figured 
                                                          
82 Montville and Chatham mayors ousted. Star-Ledger. June 9, 2004.  By Lawrence Ragonese and Kristen 
Alloway. http://www.nj.com/elections/ledger/index.ssf?/base/news-3/108676553355551.xml (paid 
archives). In a follow-up with Ms. Bramhall, I was told that the Sequoia VP had done the troubleshooting.  
83 Electronic voting's hidden perils. Mercury News. February 1, 2004. By Elise Ackerman. 
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/special_packages/election2004/7849090.htm 
84 Local residents will get to test voting machines. Index-Journal. August 19, 2004. By Wallace McBride, 
senior staff writer. Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2554 
85 E-Vote Machines Drop More Ballots. Wired News. February 9, 2004. By Kim Zetter. 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,62206,00.html 
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Indiana officials may not have been investigating North Carolina elections, so I called to tell them 
what I knew. Sure enough, they were very glad to find out. Later I read in the news that, after 
some heated sessions with the election commission, ES&S admitted the earlier version "might not 
tabulate the votes."86 
In other cases, essential information is not communicated as it should be because the vendors fail 
to follow through on their promises to inform their customers of problems.  
The ES&S iVotronic audit bug was first publicized in May of 2004.87 In July, ES&S said they were 
informing their customers about the bug.  
ES&S spokeswoman Jill Friedman Wilson said the company will continue to 
communicate with customers about the glitch and the patch. ''We will be working with 
every customer, and to the extent the solution applies to the equipment they use, help 
them with it,'' she said. 88 
But ES&S failed to inform its other customers. John Gideon, my associate at VotersUnite.Org, 
contacted election officials in Marion County, Indiana and Bexar County, Texas, both of whom 
use the flawed machines. Both were completely unaware of the audit bug. 
I wonder how many of the election officials who need to know actually do know that:  
♦ The ES&S iVotronic audit bug referenced above may impact their ability to audit their 
elections.  
♦ The Sequoia WinEDS system used in Bernalillo County has added phantom votes in every 
election since it was installed.89  
♦ The Unilect Patriot DRE machines have to be specifically set to record more than 3,005 votes. 
Otherwise, they accept them from voters and throw them away.90 
♦ The MicroVote system used in Mecklenburg County, North Carolina tallied the votes 
incorrectly, and the county officials have no explanation for it.91  
♦ The Sequoia Veri-Vote system (DRE with a voter-verified paper trail) failed to print the 
correct ballot during a demo in Sacramento in the fall of 2004.92  
                                                          
86 Election Commission Bails Out Voting Machine Maker In Time for May Primary. 
March 11, 2004; http://www.wishtv.com/Global/story.asp?S=1706282&nav=0Ra7LTW3  
87 Count Crisis? Elections official warns of glitches that may scramble vote auditing. Miami Daily 
Business Review. May 13, 2004. By Matthew Haggman. http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1084316008117 
88 Voting machines to receive digital fix. Miami-Herald. July 10, 2004. By By Mary Ellen Klas. 
http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/9120544.htm 
89 County clerk say phantom votes won't be a problem. KRQE Albuquerque. October 26, 2004. Reproduced 
at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3421 
90 Unilect vote device causes uproar. Oakland Tribune. November 24, 2004. By David Morrill. Reproduced 
at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3977 
91 Board of Elections Audits Early Voting Results; Revises Unofficial Results. Released by the 
Mecklenburg Board of Elections. November 4, 2004. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/mecklenburgnewsrelease.pdf 
92 Wrong Time for an E-Vote Glitch. Wired News. August 12, 2004. By Kim Zetter. 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,64569,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2 
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Illegal Use of Uncertified Software 
Even though the testing and certification process may be "virtually non-existent," the laws in 
most states require electronic voting equipment to be certified before it can be used in an election. 
These laws attempt to give election officials control over the software used in their elections.  
But software is not easy to control. Once a floppy disk has been inserted into the computer briefly 
or a unit has been sent to the vendor for repair, there's no way of knowing what software is 
installed on the system. Indeed, it's not unusual for state and local officials to find out about — or 
even participate in — the installation of illegal election software. Often the officials have so little 
technical experience that they do not understand the need for, or the reasons for, software 
version control (refer back to page 26). 
Without question, the officials have no way of knowing if the software actually installed is the 
version the vendor says is installed. Dr. Shamos says:  
In this whole discussion we have ignored the matter of where the software used in the 
machine comes from. It may have worked when delivered by the vendor but may have been 
modified or substituted, either deliberately or innocently, by persons known or unknown.  
In violation of state laws, and with or without the knowledge of election officials, vendors have 
installed uncertified software on systems in several states. For example:  
California – Diebold  
An audit of Diebold Election Systems voting machines in California has revealed that the 
company installed uncertified software in all 17 counties that use its electronic voting 
equipment. ... three counties, including Los Angeles, used software that had never been 
certified by the state or qualified by federal authorities for use in any election. ... The 
extent of the changes that Diebold made to upgrades of its software is still 
unknown.93  
Washington — Sequoia AVC Edge 
An email dated January 15, 2004 from Corene Henage at Sequoia Voting Systems to Joseph Smith 
at the elections office in Snohomish County, Washington, demonstrates the cavalier attitude of 
some vendors and election officials regarding software version control:  
I have attached Florida certification for Edge firmware version 4.0D. As you know, this 
version was never certified in Washington, but decision was made by Scott to go 
ahead and use it.94 
In a later email dated October 8, 2004, sent to Snohomish County officials along with a report of 
machines repaired by Sequoia, John Homewood, Engineering Manager at Sequoia said: 
There were also 11 Edges that were downgraded to 4.0D.95 
Indiana – ES&S iVotronic  
Election Systems & Software provided illegal software for last year's election, lied to the 
board about a temporary fix and fired a helpful project manager, said Clerk of the Courts 
Jill Jackson.96 
                                                          
93 E-Voting Undermined by Sloppiness. Wired News; Dec. 17, 2003 ; by Kim Zetter 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,61637,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2 
94 http://www.votersunite.org/info/Uncertified4.0d.pdf 
95 http://www.votersunite.org/info/Downgradedto40.d.pdf 
96 Election vendor under fire: Repeated mixups raise issues of trust, reliability. Indy Star; March 4, 2004; 
By Andy Gammill. Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=1412 
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Maryland – Diebold  
Black Box Voting reported that Diebold has used uncertified software in Maryland. 
According to Diebold employee emails, in the run up to the 2002 election, certified 
software was installed, but then overridden by uncertified software - before the election – 
making the vote count illegal.97  
Software is Uncontrollable 
The "National Association of State Election Directors General Overview for Getting a Voting 
System Qualified," a handbook for election equipment vendors, specifically states:  
In order to maintain its status as a NASED Qualified system, the hardware and software 
must be identical to the hardware and software tested by the ITAs. Should it differ even 
slightly, it would not meet the definition of NASED Qualified and may render the 
system in noncompliance with state's certification process, so it is incumbent upon 
the manufacturer to keep their systems current through the ITA process.  
Vendors know that in most states it's illegal to install unauthorized software. Yet they do it — 
sometimes quite casually. For example, testifying before the California Voting Systems and 
Procedures Panel regarding the widespread failure of precinct control modules in the March 2004 
primary, James Dunn, a Diebold technician, explained that the batteries were refusing to remain 
charged during the testing before the election.  
When they discovered discharged batteries, they worked frantically to get them to hold a charge, 
even to the extent of installing whatever software they thought might work. Mr. Dunn said:  
We did the software settings with a smart card insert. And they brought out new versions, 
took the old ones from us, gave us the new ones, and said start using this software. 
What versions, I'm not sure of.98  
Election officials also know that it's illegal to install unauthorized software, but their lack of 
technical knowledge causes them to rely heavily on the vendors for technical advice, and some of 
them clearly don't understand the serious potential consequences when software versions "differ 
even slightly" from one another.  
As explained on page 25, a software program is created by writing lines of instructions and then 
running the instructions through a compiler, which converts it into a program that can be 
executed on a computer. As the iVotronic audit bug illustrates, even one small change to one line 
of the code can impact the operation of the software, often in unexpected ways.  
However, many election officials do not understand the integrated nature of software and yet 
they have the authority to make decisions. For example, in a letter from Washington State 
Election Director Nick Handy to all Washington State Legislators, he explained why six counties 
in Washington would be using unqualified software in the 2004 general election:  
In addition, the software modification only occurred to the "pick a party" feature in the 
primary. This feature will not be activated in the general election.99  
Had he been a software programmer, he would have known that a compiled software program is 
a single, integrated system component, not separate elements working independently.  
                                                          
97 From Campaign for Verifiable Voting in Maryland to Karl S. Aro, Department of Legislative Services, 
Annapolis, MD; http://www.truevotemd.org/2003-12-22_Karl_Aro_Letter.pdf 
98 Meeting: State Of California Secretary Of State Voting Systems And Procedures Panel. Wednesday, 
April 21, 2004. Transcript:, page 80. http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/vsptranscript0421.pdf 
99 http://wwwvotersunite.org/info/ToWALegFromNickHandy.pdf 
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Even if election officials attempted to adhere strictly to their state laws regarding election 
software, they would have no way of knowing whether the software versions they are using are 
the ones approved by NASED and their state certification boards.  
Only by running a cryptographic checksum or hash against systems files is it possible to tell if 
a software program is identical to the version it is purported to be. 100 
Electronic Data Has No Substance That Could Resist Alteration 
Technology advances daily. Electronic data can be stored on microscopic chips, but that's 
yesterday's news. Electronic data can be transferred over internet cables, telephone wires, and 
through empty air via wireless connections, and that's yesterday's news, too. Data on one 
computer can be changed from another via cable, modem, or wireless — again yesterday's news.  
Advances in communications technology are so complex and widespread that even computer 
professionals struggle to keep abreast of the latest developments. 
Fortunately most, if not all, election directors are now aware that it is a serious breach of security 
to have their central tabulator (the computer that accumulates all the county totals) connected to 
the Internet. But still, many central tabulators are available to remote connection via modems. 
And without opening up their computers and examining the hardware inside, they can't know if 
their system is equipped for wireless communications.101 
Electronic data is not safe data. One of the primary advantages of electronic data is that it is 
stored in a form that has no more physical size or substance than electricity running through 
power cords. Unfortunately, this lack of substance is the very characteristic that allows it to be 
changed undetectably.  
Bev Harris, author of Black Box Voting, has demonstrated this fact in Diebold's tabulator,  called 
GEMS (Global Election Management Software). Electronic election totals can be changed without 
any indication that they were altered. Alterations are even possible by running a script that by-
passes GEMS, so election officials would be oblivious that anything had occurred.  
Harris said the problem lies in the fact that GEMS creates two tables of data that don't always 
match. One table consists of rows showing votes for each candidate that were recorded on 
voting machine memory cards at each precinct. The other table consists of summaries of that 
precinct data. Officials use the raw precinct data to spot-check accuracy.  
Harris said it's possible to alter the vote summaries while leaving the raw data alone. ... the 
election results that go to state officials would be manipulated, while the canvas spot check 
performed on the raw data would show that the GEMS results were accurate.  
... Harris said it's possible to change the voting summaries without using GEMS by writing 
a script in Visual Basic -- a simple, common programming language for Windows-based 
machines -- that tricks the system into thinking the votes haven't been changed.102  
Alterations are even possible remotely, as the RABA Technologies team proved in Maryland. 
The team was able to remotely upload, download, and execute files with full system 
administrator privileges. Results could be modified at will, including changing votes from 
precincts. 103 
                                                          
100 http://www.chuckherrin.com/evotingquestions.htm 
101 Photo of the wireless port on the Diebold DRE:  http://www.truevotetc.org/Photo+Gallery/63.aspx 
102 Activists Find More E-Vote Flaws. Wired News. September 22, 2004. By Kim Zetter 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,65031,00.html 
103 Even a Remote Chance? January 10, 2005. By Pokey Anderson. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/evenaremotechance.htm 
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Administration Complexities 
Chain of Custody Complexities Increase Exponentially with Electronic Data 
Election Equipment 
When votes are cast on paper ballots, they are placed into a ballot box. Carefully developed 
custody procedures have been in place for decades to ensure the security of the paper ballots – 
before they are counted and afterward in case a recount is needed.  
Custody procedures become significantly more complex when electronic equipment is used in 
elections. All election equipment must remain secure before and after the election – DREs, optical 
scanners, control modules, ballot cards (see page 36), and all other software and hardware used 
in the election process. Procedures for protecting electronic voting equipment are just now being 
developed. There has not been time to refine them. The current procedures are complex and, 
even if they were adequate, they are often not used in accordance with the law.  
♦ Each DRE and precinct optical scanner is a ballot box that must be empty before the election 
begins and safeguarded to make sure it remains empty. Each one, after being tested and 
zeroed out, must remain secure until election day.104 
♦ Each DRE, precinct optical scanner, and control module also contains a portion of the 
electronic counting process — the software. Once officials are certain that certified software is 
installed, every single DRE and precinct optical scanner must be secured to ensure that the 
software contained on it is not illegally altered between elections. 
♦ Each DRE also contains the software that selects and builds each voter's ballot from the 
information contained on the access card. That software, too, must be safeguarded from 
tampering before the election.  
♦ When machines break down during an election and are removed from service, the chain of 
custody must be maintained.  
Election equipment is particularly vulnerable to tampering after it has been tested but before it is 
used. For example, San Diego county allowed precinct workers to take the electronic machines 
home with them after the training program (up to a week before the election) so they would not 
have to pick them up the morning of the election. 105 
As Pam Smith of VerifiedVoting.org pointed out:106 
In spite of the vulnerability of Diebold's electronic voting system, the registrar sent 
computerized voting machines, cards, keys and card encoders to be stored in poll workers' 
homes before the election, secured only by easily removed stickers and flimsy plastic zip-ties. 
In one precinct observed by SAVE-Democracy's poll watchers, these security stickers had 
never even been placed over the memory card ports ---- where votes are stored ---- as they 
should have been. 
Poll workers were given extra zip-ties to hold the machines and key-card pouches closed. 
These were not inventoried and apparently were not even inspected, so no one knows if 
machines were tampered with. 
                                                          
104 Officials cannot directly ensure that the memory cards have no ballots cast on them. They can only trust 
the report from the software, which could contain errors or malicious code. (See page 27.) 
105 County ordered to offer voters paper ballots. North County Times; February 12, 2004; By Gig 
Conaughton. http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/02/13/news/top_stories/2_12_0422_53_18.txt 
106 Electronic voting was a fiasco. North County Times; February 12, 2004; By: Pamela Smith - Commentary 
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/03/16/opinion/3_15_0422_26_59.txt 
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The Electronic Ballot Box 
Using electronic voting machines does not eliminate the need to track and preserve the physical 
records of votes. When DREs are used, the physical records are in the form of ballot memory 
cards rather than paper ballots. Unlike paper, the ballot cards are not a permanent form of 
storage since the data can be erased or overwritten; thus, the level of security required is even 
higher. This means that new procedures for electronic elections must be strictly followed, in 
addition to procedures similar to the old ones when paper ballots were used.  
Note also that the loss, damage, or tampering of a ballot card is comparable to the loss, damage, 
or tampering of a ballot box, since each card contains hundreds or even thousands of votes. Since 
each memory card is about the size of a stack of five credit cards, they are much more challenging 
to track and protect than a ballot box. It would be very easy for cards to be lost or removed 
without detection, as they were in San Joaquin County, California:  
Hundreds of electronic ballot cards were lost Tuesday in San Joaquin County, left at a 
warehouse where elections' officials later discovered them, the registrar of voters 
acknowledged.  
Election workers found eight metal cases containing ballots from eight precincts at the 
Stockton warehouse after precinct officials boxed the ballots instead of handing them to 
elections officials, Registrar of Voters Deborah Hench said.  
... Precinct officials reported a "mile of cars" waiting to turn in ballots at the warehouse, 
one of four buildings to which ballots could be brought. At least one official said he 
took ballots home and returned later to deliver them.107  
Many election officials — though wise in the ways of paper — do not understand the software 
concepts behind the procedures established for electronic equipment, and they may not be 
prepared to make impromptu decisions about safeguarding electronic equipment if an unusual 
circumstance occurs. In Collin County, Texas, for example, when an electronic ballot box refused 
to give up its data, election officials sent it to Canada to have the data retrieved (see page 12.) 
Increased Problems from Human Error in Electronic Elections 
While many have advocated computerized elections as a way of reducing human error, the fact is 
that human error may be increasing because of the new and complex problems they present to 
voters and poll workers, as well as election directors.  
It is important to realize that experienced software designers expect users to make errors. 
Therefore, well-designed programs include lots of error-handling instructions for the sole 
purpose of ensuring that user errors will not waste the users' time or destroy the users' data — 
thus the "undo" command that is available in nearly every program marketed today. If a user's 
error can cause a disaster, then the fault lies in the program design, not with the user.  
Hundreds of voters have been disenfranchised or voted on the wrong ballots because trained poll 
workers had difficulty with the computerized systems. Freddie Oakley, Clerk/Recorder in Yolo 
County, California, suggests one source of the problem: 
I'm not persuaded that the pollworker's job is ever to administer an information 
technology system.  The poll worker's job is to be a witness to fair elections, and a 
witness to accurate elections.108 
                                                          
107 Electronic S.J. ballot cards lost. The Stockton Record (San Joaquin County); March 4, 2004; By David 
Siders. Excerpt reproduced on http://www.calvoter.org/news/blog/2004_03_01_blogarchive.html 
108 Interview with Freddie Oakley, Yolo County (CA) Clerk-Recorder. May 2004. By Pokey Anderson for 
Pacifica.  
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Neither should voters be disenfranchised by their inability to use an information technology 
system. However, they have been. For example:  
Palm Beach County, Florida. October 2004. Sequoia Edge DRE.109 After a woman finished 
voting, she realized the touch-screen hadn’t given her the option to vote on the two 
referendums for Boca Raton or for state House District 87. She was given the wrong ballot 
because the computer was programmed for the wrong ballot, but she can't re-vote.  
Orange County, California. March 2004 110 
Poll workers, responsible for giving each voter a four-digit code to enter into the voting 
machines, gave thousands of voters the wrong ballots.  
Adams County, Colorado. October 2004.111 Many Denver voters left in frustration when poll site 
officials were unable to connect their laptops to the central voter registration database to 
verify the voters.  
Roanoke, Virginia. November 2004. WinVote. 112 Some ballots were voided because voters left 
machines before pushing a flashing red button to record their votes.  
Even election directors continue to encounter new and unexpected problems as they learn to use 
their electronic election equipment.  
Elko County, Nevada. December, 2004. Sequoia Edge DRE.113 A month after the election, it was 
discovered that 271 votes had not been retrieved from the memory cartridges and were never 
counted. 
I spoke with Elko County Clerk Win Smith and discovered that the voting machines had 
been left in test mode on election day, so the upload process had disregarded the votes. 
Problems had occurred with those machines and cartridges on election day, but Ms. 
Smith and her staff didn't understand their significance, since they had received no 
training on using the machines before the election.  
Bernalillo County, New Mexico. October 2004. Sequoia Edge DRE.114 County Clerk Mary 
Herrera acknowledged that "phantom votes" (more votes than voters) had appeared in the 
last three elections, ever since she "upgraded" to the new version of WinEDS (Sequoia's 
election management system). She claimed her staff has always managed to remove the 
bogus votes before the final tally. Refer to page 6 for an overview of the 8,656 phantom votes 
reported by Bernalillo County in November 2004.  
                                                          
109 Balloting Blunders. Boca Raton News. October 30, 2004. By Dale M. King. 
http://www.bocaratonnews.com/index.php?src=news&category=Local%20News&prid=9999 
110 7,000 Orange County Voters Were Given Bad Ballots.  
Los Angeles Times; March 9, 2004; By Ray F. Herndon and Stuart Pfeifer, Staff Writers.  
Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=2389 
111 Early Voting Begins In Colorado. October 18, 2004. By Steven K. Paulson, Associated Press Writer. 
http://news4colorado.com/campaign2004/local_story_292161858.html 
112 Back up! We need back up! Roanoke.com. November 11, 2004. By Brian Gottstein. 
http://www.roanoke.com/columnists/gottstein/13719.html 
113 Missing votes found in machines. Elko Daily Free Press. December 8, 2004. By Dave Woodson, Staff 
Writer. Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=4147 
114 County clerk say phantom votes won't be a problem. KRQE Albuquerque. October 26, 2004. 
Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=3421 
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Violation of Ballot Secrecy with the Use of DREs 
Voters in many states have complained that DRE voting systems do not provide adequate ballot 
secrecy. There are no voting booth curtains, DRE voting displays are nearly vertical, and in many 
cases, voters voting on adjacent DREs or other voters waiting in line could view their selections.  
In other cases, when voters encounter a problem in mid-ballot and called for the assistance of a 
poll worker, they often have to give up the secrecy of their ballot in order to page back and forth 
through their electronic ballot to demonstrate the problem to the poll worker. 
Michael Cadigan, president of the Albuquerque City Council, had a similar experience 
when he voted at City Hall. "I cast my vote for president. I voted for Kerry and a check 
mark for Bush appeared," he said. He reported the problem immediately and was shown 
how to alter the ballot.115 
Voter David Solomon at the Good Hope Community Center in Montgomery County 
[Maryland] tried twice to vote for his preferred candidate, but each time the “X” appeared 
next to another candidate’s name. After getting the assistance of an election judge, 
he tried a third time and believes he was successful—but is not certain. 116 
Running an Electronic Election - a Ballot Judge's Summary 
Because the systems are complex and confusing, one of the challenges of using electronic voting 
equipment is recruiting and training poll workers. Here is part of an edited description of one 
ballot judge's training experience in Montgomery County, Maryland. As his parenthetical 
remarks so clearly point out, the challenge is increased by the fact that the systems are new and 
the inexperienced trainers are teaching new procedures.117  
Before the use of electronic "machines", voting volunteers arrived at 6:00 at the polling sites 
to set up the mechanical ones. Now, volunteers are asked to meet the day before elections 
(new) for some additional set up duties. On the actual voting day, volunteers will do much of 
the same as they previously did except for those new functions that result from using the new 
electronic equipment.  
The new "machines" now have a plastic seal which needs to be broken (new) to assure the 
absence of tampering. Previously, no seal was used or necessary. Seal numbers now must 
be recorded (new) on a control sheet (new), put into a plastic zipper bag (new), and returned 
(new) to the Board of Elections, presumably for validation and cross checking. A tally sheet 
(new) also needs to be stuck to the side of each "machine" (new) for use as voters are 
escorted (new) to the "machines". That has implications to be explained later.  
The "machine" is plugged in and turned on - it has a battery pack should there be a power 
failure. The Chief Judges come with a key (new) open the gates to the hard drives (new) and 
record the data from each (new), presumably the number of the drive, perhaps the count on 
the "odometer" and the count on the "counter" for the day's tallies. They will do the same at 
the end of the day (new), all this for "security." Note that all functions described are done "in 
tandem", that is by two people, each representing one of the major parties, again for 
"security". 
... Any way you look at it, the introduction of the "machines" has complicated the voting 
process and increased the workload of the volunteer staff.  
                                                          
115 Some Early Voters Say Machines Mark Incorrect Choices. ABQJournal. October 22, 2004. By Jim 
Ludwick, Journal Staff Writer. http://abqjournal.com/elex/246845elex10-22-04.htm 
116 When the Right to Vote Goes Wrong. TrueVoteMD. November, 2004. 
http://www.truevotemd.org/Election_Report.pdf 
117 Jaime Manzano, Bethesda, Maryland 
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Running an Electronic Election – an Election Official's Report 
The official report on San Diego's use of touch screens (DREs) on Super Tuesday (March 2004) 
shows increased need for poll workers, poll worker training, machine testing, pre-election 
education, and poll-worker support on election day.  
The following excerpts are taken from the official San Diego County polling report released after 
the California primary on March 2, 2004. They show that the effort involved in running an 
election is significantly increased by the use of touch screen voting machines. (Bold highlighting 
has been added to notable comments.) 118 
Recruitment of Poll Workers 
Because of the move to the new voting system, the Registrar of Voters recruited 600 
more poll workers than in past elections. A new County employee poll worker 
program was implemented, and approximately 900 County staff served in key poll 
worker positions throughout the day.  
Training of Poll Workers 
In prior elections, two poll workers – a Precinct Inspector and Assistant Precinct Inspector 
– were trained on the voting equipment, election processes and the legal aspects of 
operating the polls. Because of new procedures and requirements for the touch screen 
machines, two more positions were added – the Systems Inspector and the Systems 
Assistant – who were responsible for the set up and operation of the machines.  
Each of the more than 3,200 Systems Inspector and Assistant Systems Inspector 
received 2-1/2 hours of hands-on training specifically on setting the equipment up, 
creating voter access cards, logging into the card-encoding devices, use of the touch 
screens, and closing down the equipment at the end of election day. 
The Precinct Inspector and Assistant Precinct Inspector [3,200 of them] received two 
hours of training on the election processes and the legal aspects of operating the polls... 
Testing of Equipment 
All 10,200 touch screens and 1,700 Precinct Control Modules underwent acceptance 
testing at the Registrar of Voters. 
Troubleshooter Hotline and Other Phone Support 
The Registrar of Voters had the following phone support available to answer questions 
from the polling places: 
♦ 11 troubleshooter hotline phones. All poll workers were provided with this phone 
number. 
♦ 12 direct lines to recruitment staff that had been working with the poll workers during 
the weeks and months prior to the election. 
♦ 38 Registrar of Voters phone bank lines that supplemented the other lines during the 
peak incident period. 
♦ 10 dispatch phones for communicating with Supervising Troubleshooters. 
♦ 26 Supervising Troubleshooters. Diebold also had 12 staff at the Registrar's office to 
assist with technical support and to address systems questions. 
                                                          
118 Correspondence, written report regarding Touchscreen voting system used for the first time March 2, 
2004 by the County of San Diego. From: Walter F. Ekard; Chief Administrative Officer 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/county/20040310-1315-report.html 
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Field Support 
The Registrar of Voters recruited 26 Supervising Troubleshooters, who were available in 
the field from 5:30 a.m. until the polls closed on Election Day. These Supervisors were 
coordinating and working with approximately 200 Rovers who were supplied by 
Diebold, each assigned to monitor a set of polling places in their designated area. 
Rovers began making their rounds at 5:30 a.m. as well.119  
Outreach/Public Education 
The Registrar of Voters made a significant effort to educate the public on the use of the 
new system. A public education campaign was developed with the help of the contractor. 
This included a web site, educational brochures and other written materials, and an 
instructional video. Additionally, teams from the Registrar of Voters demonstrated the 
equipment at shopping malls and at community meetings throughout the county during 
the months preceding the election. More than 60 demonstrations were conducted, 
reaching more than 5,000 voters.  
Election Day 
Each polling location received four to eight Diebold TSx touch screen voting machines, 
based on the number of registered voters, and a Precinct Control Module (PCM). The 
system used in this election uses an encoded card to give voters access to their 
appropriate ballot on the touch screen machines. These access cards are encoded by 
the PCM. The encoded card is then inserted into one of the voting machines to activate 
the appropriate ballot for each individual voter. 
Early on election morning poll workers at each polling site removed the PCM from its 
sealed case and set it up. At approximately 40% of the sites, poll workers found that 
the machine did not display the expected login screen. Some of the more computer-
savvy poll workers were able to maneuver through a series of screens until they found 
the specific login screen upon which they had been trained. Other poll workers did not, as 
they had only been trained with the expected screen. Therefore, they were not able to 
perform the card-encoding function. Without the ability to encode the electronic ballot 
cards at those polls, voters could not vote. There were no back-up paper ballots at 
the polling locations. Provisional ballots were also electronic. Therefore, many poll 
workers could not open the polls for voting at 7 a.m. 
... At 7 a.m. 64% (1,038 of 1,611) of polling sites were operational. By 8:00 a.m., 88% 
(1,419) were open and by 9:00 a.m., 98% (1,580) were open. Before 10:00 a.m., 21 more 
polls were open. Nine additional polls were open after 10 a.m. and the one final poll 
opened at 11:05 a.m. 
Rovers were available to help starting at 5:30, and some estimates indicate that the problem may 
have occurred at as many as 80% of the precincts.  
Preliminary Findings 
Most aspects of the March 2 election went very well. ... However, there were problems 
that must be addressed. Most importantly, there was a significant and unexpected 
problem, which resulted in the delayed opening of 573 out of 1,611 polling places. This 
inconvenienced many voters, some of whom returned later or went to another polling site, 
and some who were unable to return at all to vote. There is no method to accurately 
measure how many voters were unable to vote.  
                                                          
119 All vendor technicians are paid by the county for their services and their travel, adding significantly to 
the cost of the election. 
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Technical 
Approximately 40% of the PCM devices failed to "boot-up" to the correct screen 
when turned on by the poll workers. Diebold Election Systems, manufacturer of the voting 
machines has made a preliminary determination that the problem experienced with the 
PCM devices was caused by an unexpected discharge of the internal battery. This 
loss of power caused an unfamiliar screen to come up for poll workers upon start up ...  
The possibility of this large-scale hardware problem was not anticipated by the 
manufacturer.120  However, it was determined to be a possibility on a smaller scale and 
26 supervising troubleshooters were armed with the remedy, as they were for other 
potential issues that might arise. 
Technical support in the field was not consistent in that some precincts received support, 
and others never received a visit from their roving support person.  
Management Complexities 
Saving Money by Combining Precincts May Decrease Voter Turnout 
Some counties are combining precincts to reduce the number of polling places. The reason for 
combining is two-fold. When county officials first consider the cost of the new electronic voting 
machines, they realize how much it is going to cost and try to save money by buying fewer 
machines. One way is to combine precincts, increasing wait times as well as voter confusion.  
After the first election with the new machines, they realize that they now need twice the number 
of poll workers they did before they used the complicated new systems. So they consider 
combining more precincts to cut down on the cost of poll workers and training.  
Every time a polling place is closed, voters must go somewhere else to vote. This causes some 
confusion and, in many cases, forces voters to travel further to vote. Comfort levels go down, and 
some citizens don't bother to vote. 
Potential DRE Problems Inherent in Electronic Devices121 
Touch Screen Misalignment 
The sensors in touch screen devices can be knocked out of alignment by shock and vibration that 
may occur during transport. Unless these sensors are realigned at the polling place prior to the 
start of voting, touch screen machines can misinterpret a voter's intent. For example, a voter 
might touch the part of the screen identified with candidate Jones, but candidate Smith's box 
would light up instead.  
Such vote-jumping problems have occurred on touch screens for years. The problem was 
reported in a dozen counties across the country during the 2004 general election. See page 8 for 
examples.  
Diebold, ES&S, and Sequoia products all use resistive touch screens. The longest warranty 
provided for a resistive touch screen is five years.122 
                                                          
120 The manufacturer's official claim is contradicted by the testimony of James Dunn, a Diebold technician, 
who told the California VSSP that battery problems plagued the pre-election testing.  
Meeting: State Of California Secretary Of State Voting Systems And Procedures Panel. Wednesday, 
April 21, 2004. Transcript:, page 77-80. http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/vsptranscript0421.pdf 
121 Much of this section is based on information compiled by Robert Kibrick, research astronomer for  the 
University of California Observatories/Lick Observatory; see http://voting.idlecircuits.com/ 
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Power Surges or Static Electricity Discharges  
Like any computer or electronic system, touch screen voting machines could be disturbed by 
power surges or static electricity discharges, such as those that sometimes occur during lightning 
storms. Such interference could cause votes already cast to be lost or a voting station to become 
inoperative. Although touch screen machines are required to meet certain specifications 
regarding immunity to electrostatic discharges, during conditions of severe weather such 
discharges might exceed the specified limits.  
Electrical Outages and Inadequate Battery Charges 
Most touch screen voting machines have backup electrical power that is provided by means of an 
internal, rechargeable battery similar to those in a small Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). 
These batteries, if fully-charged, are intended to provide several hours of backup power, so that 
power outages of moderate length should not impact the operation of the voting machine.  
Unfortunately, on the morning of an election, the batteries in these voting machines might be 
either partially or fully discharged. In some cases, voting machines may have batteries that are no 
longer able to take a charge if the machines have been stored for long in an unpowered state.  
Many of these machines use sealed lead acid batteries, which will discharge over time. The longer 
they remain uncharged, the less able they are to be fully recharged. The lifetime of such batteries 
is significantly degraded if they are not recharged on a regular basis. Anyone who leaves a car 
undriven for months at a time is likely to find that car with a dead battery that may refuse to hold 
a charge. The same concept applies to touch screen voting machines that employ lead acid 
battery technology and which are left for months at a time disconnected from electrical power.  
Arapahoe County will spend an extra $100,000 on Tracy Baker's recall election, because 
nobody bothered to charge the batteries in county voting machines. 
County commissioners blame Baker, the clerk and recorder, who oversaw the machines 
as they sat unplugged and their power seeped away. Baker blames commissioners, 
saying they took away his ability to charge the machines by placing an elections worker 
on administrative leave. 
Ed Bosier, the county assessor put in charge of the recall, won't blame anyone. But he 
said Wednesday that the cost of replacing 800 batteries - which can't be recharged once 
they've died - will probably push the price of the election over $400,000. 
... Bosier, who discovered the dead batteries in October and ordered them replaced in 
time for the recall, said new batteries will cost about $80,000. Installing them, county 
officials say, will cost around $15,000 more.123 
To ensure that the batteries of touch screen voting machines will be fully charged on the morning 
of an election, in the days or hours before the polls open election officials need to test every touch 
screen voting machine in their inventory to:  
♦ Verify that the battery in each unit is still able to take a charge, and if not, replace it with a 
new battery,  
♦ Verify that the battery-recharging electronics in each voting machine are operating correctly 
and are able to charge the battery, and  
♦ Verify that the battery in each voting machine is fully-charged before the polls open.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
122 http://www.elotouch.com/products/accutec/accben.asp 
123 Getting zapped for vote. Clerk's recall election $100,000 pricier after batteries for voting machines lose 
juice. Rocky Mountain News; February 5, 2004; By Jim Tankersley,  
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/election/article/0,1299,DRMN_36_2631038,00.html 
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If such precautions are not taken (and it is likely that they will not, given the level of manpower 
required to carry them out), the batteries in these voting machines will not provide the number of 
hours of backup power advertised in the vendors' specifications. Thus, should a power outage 
occur during an election, it is likely that many of these voting machines may become unusable 
because their batteries will not have sufficient charge to keep them operating during the outage.  
For example, in Solano County, California, on March 2, 2004, Diebold TSx voting machines were 
daisy-chained together and plugged into a single outlet. While this is handy for charging 
batteries during storage and keeping cables to a minimum during elections, it places a high load 
on the circuit. The overloaded circuit breaker shut off, and the machines kept running on 
batteries. Since it affected only the single circuit, poll workers didn't notice the problem. After 
three hours, the batteries ran down and all the machines shut off. The poll workers called the 
Fairfield headquarters and were told to hand out provisional ballots until the circuit was reset 
and the machines were re-started.124 
In those cases where a battery has been fully discharged and is unable to take a charge, if the 
power goes out, the voting machine may shut down without any warning. If this occurs while 
voters are in the midst of casting their votes, they will be left in limbo, not knowing whether or 
not their vote has been cast. They will have no way of finding out until power is restored, and it 
is unlikely that they will be able to remain at the polling place waiting for that to happen. The 
votes of such voters will thus likely be lost.  
Maintenance Challenges 
As touch screen voting machines age, like all electronic equipment, they will inevitably develop 
maintenance and reliability problems. This will require more technically savvy election workers 
at each polling place, that is, workers who have the skills needed to troubleshoot and respond to 
such problems. Already, many localities are having difficulty finding adequate numbers of 
temporary workers to operate their polling places. 
While some elections officials may argue that touch screen machines will be easier for poll 
workers to deal with than optical scan paper ballots, it is simply not true that a malfunctioning 
touch screen machine will be simpler to deal with than a marking pen that has run out of ink.  
Rapid Obsolescence and Toxic Waste Disposal 
Given the rapid pace at which computer technology advances, touch screen voting machines will 
become obsolete and potentially unmaintainable within a few years. When that occurs, they will 
be expensive to replace, and funds may not exist at that time to help counties bear the cost. 
When touch screen machines are retired from service, like any other computer, they represent a 
toxic waste disposal problem. Unlike optical scan ballots, they can't be readily recycled. While the 
volume of toxic waste generated by the disposal of touch screen machines represents a small 
fraction of the total, nevertheless it is an issue to consider when selecting a voting system, 
especially since there are less toxic alternatives.  
Rechargeable batteries in these touch screen voting machines will wear out and require 
replacement. This adds to the long term operating and maintenance costs for these voting 
machines. These expended batteries will also present a toxic waste disposal issue. While small in 
magnitude when compared to the number of car batteries that are disposed of every year, the 
problem of voting machine battery disposal is not incurred by alternative voting technologies 
such as optical scan ballot cards.  
                                                          
124 Registrar says electronic vote went smoothly. Times-Herald; March 4, 2004; By Matthias Gafni, Times-
Herald staff writer. http://www.verifiedvoting.org/article.asp?id=1428 
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5 HAVA-Compliant Alternatives to Paperless Voting 
Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) 
While some states, such as Maryland and Georgia, now have election systems that are fully 
paperless DREs, there is a great deal of resistance to paperless voting on many fronts. Many 
officials and citizen groups are strong advocates of using only paper records of the vote that 
voters have reviewed and approved (voter-verified paper audit trail, or VVPAT) to provide 
evidence of the voters' intentions and allow for a meaningful recount.  
Legislation and executive orders requiring VVPAT also require the availability of ballots on 
which disabled individuals can vote without assistance. 
As Susan Nielsen, Associate Editor of The Oregonian says, "It's not because they distrust 
technology. It's because everything in democracy needs checks and balances. And every vote, 
whether for local sewer commissioner or national president, needs to be counted openly. Not 
tallied and zapped."125 
♦ Federal legislators: There is growing support nationwide for federal legislation that would 
require all voting systems to provide a voter-verified paper record of all votes. As of October 
8, 2004, 192 members of the U.S. House of Representatives (over 44% of its members) and 20 
members of the U.S. Senate, including Democrats, Republicans, and Independents, have 
cosponsored a requirement that all voting systems provide a VVPAT by 2006 or sooner. 
♦ State legislators: In the last two years, bills aimed at ensuring a VVPAT on election 
equipment have been introduced into 22 states and passed in six states.126 In April of 2004, 
Vermont banned paperless voting altogether by passing a bill that includes this sentence. "No 
voting shall occur in any general election which does not use printed ballots."127  
♦ Chief election officials: Officials in at least eight states128 have declared that they will insist 
on a voter-verified paper audit trail for elections in their states. Some say that since there is 
time before the HAVA deadlines, they are waiting for the development of a technology that 
gives them and their constituents confidence in the election outcomes.  
♦ Citizen organizations: Coalitions of concerned citizens have formed in at least 30 states for 
the sole purpose of working for verifiable elections in their states.129 Several national 
organizations are dedicated wholly to this same goal, and others are forming departments to 
work in various ways toward verifiable elections across the country.  
However, even a VVPAT cannot prevent voters from receiving and accidentally casting an 
incorrect or incomplete ballot — a problem that has occurred in many recent elections (see pages 
9 and 14 for examples). Nor can VVPAT avoid the ballot secrecy violations that occur when a 
voter must call a poll worker to help with a malfunctioning DRE (see page 38). 
Many Americans, discouraged by the multitude of problems that have come to light as election 
equipment has come under recent scrutiny, are advocating the exclusive use of optical scan 
equipment or even a return to the simplicity and verifiability of paper ballots, hand counted. 
                                                          
125 An America where votes disappear. April 4, 2004. http://www.oregonlive.com/news/oregonian/ 
susan_nielsen/index.ssf?/base/editorial/1080997112176372.xml 
126 http://verifiedvoting.org/article.php?list=type&type=13 
127 S.202 — http://www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/legdoc.cfm?URL=/docs/2004/acts/ACT094.HTM 
128 California, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont, West Virginia 
129 http://www.votersunite.org/info/groups.asp 
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Precinct-Count Optical Scan Systems 130 
Optical scan ballots are printed on card stock. Ballots can be available in different languages as 
needed. Voters cast their votes by filling in the "bubbles" or connecting arrows on optical scan 
ballots. Voters use lightweight, portable voting booths to afford privacy while voting. These are 
available in heights to accommodate standing voters as well as ADA-compliant wheelchair-
height versions. 131 
Once voters complete their ballots, they insert them into the precinct-count optical scanner. Over-
voted ballots are rejected, and the voter gets a fresh ballot. Blank ballots produce a warning, and 
the voter gets the opportunity to correct the ballot. After a ballot is successfully completed and 
accepted by the optical scanner, the votes on the ballot are counted into the scanner's memory, 
and the scanner deposits the ballot into a locked ballot box.  
At the close of the polls, the optical scanner produces a printout of all of the vote totals, the totals 
are sent to election central, and the locked ballot box is transported to election central in case the 
ballots were needed for any subsequent recount or audit.  
Examples Of Large States & Cities Using Precinct-Count Optical Scan 
Illinois Precinct-count optical scan systems are used by 41% of the population of Illinois 
voters (5 million). Will County, Illinois has posted a web page describing their 
rationale for choosing a precinct-count optical scan solution. 132 
Arizona 100% of the State of Arizona is using precinct-count optical scan or will soon. 133  
Michigan The Secretary of State of Michigan has recommended that that entire State use 
precinct-count optical scan. 134 
Seattle King County also encompasses the cities surrounding Seattle and has more voters 
than the state of New Mexico.135 
Adding a single ballot-marking device at each polling place fulfills the HAVA requirements 
for accessibility to the disabled.  
Two major studies of voting systems determined that precinct-count optical scan systems 
outperformed DRE voting machines in terms of residual voting errors and cost per voter. 136  
                                                          
130 Examples: ES&S Model 100 precinct-count optical ballot scanner; 
http://www.essvote.com/HTML/products/m100.html 
Diebold Election Systems AccuVote-OS; http://www2.diebold.com/dieboldes/accuvote_os.htm 
Vogue Election Systems AutoScan; http://www.vogueelection.com/products_autoscan.html 
131 Example: Vogue Election Systems Vogue-I voting booth. 
http://www.vogueelection.com/products_votingbooth.html 
132 http://www.willclrk.com/votingsystem.htm#Why%20was%20the%20optical%20scan%20system%20selected? 
133 http://www.azsos.gov/releases/2003/pressrelease46.htm 
134 http://www.michigan.gov/sos/0,1607,7-127-1640_9150-43906--M_2001_5,00.html 
135 http://www.metrokc.gov/exec/news/1998/vote421d.htm 
136 Report on Election Systems Reform. July, 2001. George Washington University, Institute For 
Communitarian Policy Studies. http://www.gwu.edu/~icps/ExecutiveSummary.pdf 
"In conclusion, our analysis points to paper ballot, fill-in-the-dot, precinct-count optical mark reader 
systems as the clear technological option of choice on cost-benefit grounds."  
 Caltech-MIT Voting Technology Project: Voting - What Is, What Could Be. July 2001.  
http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/2001report.html 
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Optical scan technology is a cost-effective and accountable system that meets the needs of both 
absentee and polling-place voters. Increasing capacity simply means adding more low-cost 
booths, and booths can easily be redistributed on election to decrease lines at the polls. Many 
believe the limited funds available under HAVA would be better spent on optical scan 
technology, known to be one of the most reliable voting technologies currently in use.  
After years of wrangling and protests, Secretary of State Ken Blackwell announced 
Wednesday that he will limit Ohio's uncompleted voting-machine conversion to a single 
device: the precinct-count optical-scan machine.137  
Computerized Ballot-Marking Devices 
Computerized ballot marking devices138, which allow persons with disabilities to vote 
independently, can be used in conjunction with precinct-count optical scan machines. In addition 
to the standard touch screen interface (non-DRE), they provide an audio interface for blind, 
visually-impaired, or reading-impaired voters and print each voter's choices on the standard 
optical scan ballot inserted by the voter.  
They provide over-vote and under-vote protection, thus ensuring that the optical scan ballot 
completed by any voter is correctly filled in. Thus, any optical scan ballot completed by the 
ballot-marking device will be readily accepted by the precinct-count optical scanner.  
Individuals with visual impairments can use the ballot-marking device to verify their ballots. 
When a completed ballot is inserted, the machine reads the ballot and either displays it on the 
screen or provides an audio description of the votes through the headphones.  
Non-Computerized Ballot-Marking Assistive Device - The Vote-PAD 
The Voting-on-Paper Assistive Device (Vote-PAD) is an inexpensive, non-electronic, voter-assist 
alternative that helps most people with visual or dexterity impairments to vote independently. 
The Vote-PAD can be used in any jurisdiction. It is customized to provide access to each 
precinct’s hand-counted or optically-scanned paper ballot.139  
The heart of the Vote-PAD is the transparent “ballot sleeve,” which encloses the ballot on both 
sides and reveals the content of the ballot that slips into it. The Vote-PAD is composed of one 
custom ballot sleeve for each sheet of a ballot. The sleeves are bound together between front and 
back opaque covers for privacy. A page-turning aid is attached to the outside of each page cover 
to assist voters with dexterity impairments in turning the pages.  
Holes are cut out of the sleeve at locations where a voter can mark choices. The sleeve protects 
the ballot from stray marks. Raised dots attached to the sleeve beside each cutout provide tactile 
indications for blind voters. An audio tape interprets the raised dots so listeners know which hole 
corresponds to which candidate — just like the tactile ballot templates used in Rhode Island since 
2000.  
Unlike voter-assist methods that only offer audio for blind voters, the Vote-PAD can be 
accompanied by Braille instructions, thus allowing voters who are both blind and deaf to vote 
unassisted – an advantage neither DREs nor ballot-marking devices have. A light-sensing wand 
                                                          
137 Ohio pulls plug on electronic voting. Blackwell opts for people filling out ballots by hand. Cleveland 
Plain Dealer Bureau. January 13, 2005. By Julie Carr Smyth. 
http://www.cleveland.com/news/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/news/1105612399208372.xml 
138 Examples: ES&S — http://www.AutomarkTS.com; IVS — http://www.ivsllc.com/  
Avante — http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/accessible_optical_voting.html 
139 http://www.vote-pad.us/ 
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allows voters with visual impairments to review their selections. As they replay the audio tape, 
or re-read the Braille instructions, they point the wand at each candidate location to receive 
audible feedback indicating whether or not the location is marked.  
An opaque, sliding “privacy shield” sits in a pocket inside the front cover and slides part-way out 
to conceal the ballot as it is being deposited in a ballot box or precinct scanner.  
Open Voting Consortium Software 
A group of computer scientists and engineers with the Open Voting Consortium140  is developing 
electronic voting software to be run on standard computers, even the older models that have 
been replaced by leading edge technology. Counties could rent computers for elections or use old 
computers stored in their basements. The software is open-source — open to public scrutiny.  
OVC voting systems will accommodate different languages and scoring methods, as well as 
voters with special needs. The OVC will distribute the software free of charge. Following is an 
excerpt from a newspaper article written before a demonstration of the system in San Jose, 
California. 
Although it's far from a finished product, the system retains what's good about current 
electronic voting systems. It's voter-friendly, easier than older systems to administer, and 
accessible to blind voters without assistance.  
It also addresses the concerns of today's critics. First, it uses open-source software that's 
available for public inspection - eliminating the secrecy that outrages critics of today's 
proprietary "black box" systems.  
Second, the software is free and can run on a variety of computer platforms, which 
makes the system cheaper to acquire and maintain. Third, it creates a paper trail of 
printed ballots that can be counted by hand or machine in case of disputed elections - 
without compromising privacy for the blind.  
... In the consortium's system, the voting terminal can be a touch screen like today's 
electronic touch-screens, with the same type of audio accessories for blind voters. But 
the terminal's main job, once the voter is finished, is to print a paper ballot that identifies 
the voter's choices - along with a bar code that records the information in computer-
readable form.  
Once the voter is satisfied, he puts the ballot into a locked box. To verify their ballots, 
blind voters can hide their printed choices in a security folder and run the bar code under 
a verifying scanner, which reads back their votes through headphones - eliminating the 
paper ballot's privacy concerns.  
When the polls close, the ballots are scanned on a separate tabulating system. Election 
judges can compare the scanned totals with those stored in the voting terminals to see if 
there are any discrepancies. The original ballots are still available to settle disputes - and 
unlike scanned paper ballots in older systems, the voter's choices are always clearly 
marked. 141 
You can download and test the software or simply see a simulation on the Internet.142  
                                                          
140 "The Open Voting Consortium (OVC) is a non-profit organization dedicated to the development, 
maintenance, and delivery of open voting systems for use in public elections." 
http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ 
141 Open system might plug up holes in the e-voting process. Baltimore Sun; April 1, 2004; By Mike 
Himowitz. http://www.baltimoresun.com/technology/custom/pluggedin/bal-
pl.himowitz01apr01,0,4595991.column?coll=bal-pe-pluggedin 
142 http://gyaku.pair.com/~vote/ballot.html 
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DREs with Integrated Printer for Printing Voter-Verified Paper Records  
Like a DRE, a touch-screen voting machine with an integrated VVPAT printer143 prevents over-
voting and warns about under-voting as well as providing an audio interface for blind, visually-
impaired, or reading-impaired voters. It provides an accessible voter-verified paper audit trail 
(VVPAT) printer, with an audio read-back capability for those voters. 
Some manufacturers of paperless DRE systems are developing add-on printers to provide 
VVPAT. Sequoia Voting Systems now offers their "Veri-Vote" system, which was used by half the 
population of Nevada in the 2004 general election. Questions remain about whether the printout 
matches the electronic record of the vote, since in an August 2004 demonstration of the system to 
California lawmakers , the printout did not match the vote that was cast.144 
Ballot Integrity Project Proposal 
In their common belief that "Accuracy can only be assured through publicly observed hand 
counts of all ballots cast," an organization called the Citizens for Election Integrity are advocating 
a return to paper ballots, hand counted.145 The group's long term goal is stated below.  
American election history has demonstrated the poor reliability of vote counting 
machines. More serious than frequent accidental counting errors is the threat of 
intentional vote fraud. Computer technology now makes possible massive vote fraud that 
is often undetectable. American democracy will never be secure as long as votes are 
counted inside black box machines. 
It is therefore recommended that all U.S. elections be conducted under the following 
conditions: 
1. All votes cast on paper ballots having legal vote status. 
2. Upon close of polling place, immediate hand count of all paper ballots in public view. 
3. Upon completion of hand count, vote totals recorded immediately in triplicate on 
official report forms and signed by all election officials present. 
4. One official report form posted immediately on wall of polling place.  
5. Two remaining official reports and sealed ballot box delivered immediately to 
appropriate election authorities. 
6. All paper ballots retained by election authorities in secure location until statute of 
limitation expires. 
7. Publicly funded nonpartisan exit polls conducted and reported on Election Day for all 
federal, state and other key elections. 
8. Computerized voting machines producing a voter-verified paper ballot may be used 
in addition to, but not in lieu of, a manual parallel accounting control system. 
This group's proposal underscores the severe concern many Americans now have about 
electronic vote-recording and tabulation. Since the proposal addresses tabulation only, the paper 
ballot recommendation could easily allow independent voting for the disabled if the voting 
systems offered optical scan ballots with a ballot-marking device or the Vote-PAD. 
                                                          
143 Examples: Avante, http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/home.htm 
and AccuPoll, http://www.accupoll.com/ and TruVote, http://www.truvote.com/ 
144 Wrong Time for an E-Vote Glitch. Wired News. August 12, 2004. By Kim Zetter. 
http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,64569,00.html?tw=wn_tophead_2 
145 The Ballot Integrity Project: Proposal for the Creation of a National Task Force.  
March 29,2004; By Citizens for Election Integrity 
http://www.wesavedemocracy.org/docs/BIP_TF-proposal_reviewed_032904.doc 
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6 HAVA-Compliant Voting System Costs 
DRE Systems 
The capital costs of DREs vary, depending on the contract. The following examples are partial 
costs, since the primary sources were newspaper reports that didn't mention items such as 
training, maintenance, additional peripherals, and software.  
Best Price in Nation Guaranteed to Ohio by Three Vendors 
Ohio has signed contracts with Election Systems and Software, Diebold Election Systems, and 
Maximus/Hart Intercivic/DFM Associates to provide voting equipment for the state. "[Secretary 
of State Kenneth] Blackwell estimated that at least three electronic voting devices or one optical 
scan device would be needed at each of the state's 11,434 precincts."146 
In the contracts, the vendors agreed to sell their products to Ohio at the lowest prices in the 
nation and with the best warranty, service, and maintenance terms. If any of the three vendors 
sell at a lower price to other states, Ohio receives a discount. Article excerpt: 
"We have a few things in our contract that benefit the state and taxpayers" that Sequoia 
did not agree to, LoParo said. "We were able to negotiate for the best pricing in the 
nation for election systems, and included in that pricing was the best warranty terms, best 
service and maintenance terms vendors have ever agreed to.  
One of the issues Sequoia did state to election officials is they didn't want to be tied to 
Ohio's low prices.  
"We also have the stipulation if they offer another government entity a price that is lower 
than Ohio, they would have to give Ohio a discount."  
Blackwell's office also retained the right to terminate the contract. 147 
The contracts call for the following prices for each machine:  
Manufacturer Model Price Each  3 DREs each in 11,434 precincts 
Diebold AccuVote-TS  $2,964  $101,671,128 
ES&S iVotronics  $2,896  $99,338,592 
Hart Intercivic eSlate 3000  $2,997  $102,803,094 
 
[Note: Citizen groups like CASE Ohio forced this March 2004 contract to be reconsidered and 
managed to delay implementation of DREs. In January 2005, Blackwell chose optical scan for 
Ohio, and limited counties' choices to two vendors, ES&S and Diebold.148] 
                                                          
146 Three companies sign contracts to sell machines.  
San Jose Mercury News; Feb. 09, 2004; Associated Press 
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/politics/7913465.htm 
147 County to choose voting system; Three companies selected as eligible vendors  
Newark Ohio Advocate; February 11, 2004; By Lachelle Seymour, Advocate Reporter  
http://www.newarkadvocate.com/news/stories/20040211/localnews/394868.html 
148 Ohio pulls plug on electronic voting. Blackwell opts for people filling out ballots by hand. Cleveland 
Plain Dealer Bureau. January 13, 2005. By Julie Carr Smyth. 
http://www.cleveland.com/news/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/news/1105612399208372.xml 
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Diebold DRE Price for San Diego 
San Diego County paid approximately $3,040 per Diebold DRE, to include a printer. The printers 
are yet to be supplied.  
San Diego County spent about $31 million to buy 10,200 Diebold AccuVote-TSx touch-
screen machines.149 Diebold agreed to upgrade the machines to include a printer that 
would print a voter-verifiable paper record, at no additional charge.150  
Additional costs for San Diego included, among other items: 
One Precinct Control Module for each of the 1,611 precincts $2,125 each =  $3,423,375 
Thirty early voter vote-card encoders  $495 each =  $14,850 
Four central optical scan machines for absentee ballots $60,000 each =  $240,000 
Diebold DRE Price for Maryland 
Purchasing 16,000 machines for $55.6 million, Maryland paid approximately $3,475 per Diebold 
DRE, not including a printer.151 This figure, presumably, also includes similar additional costs.  
Increased Cost Per Ballot when DREs are Used 
One of the arguments made in support of paperless touch screen voting machines is that they 
will save jurisdictions money by reducing the amount spent on printing and distributing paper 
ballots. But ballots must still be provided for absentee voting and provisional voting, and ballots 
are typically provided at polling places in case of equipment failure. So, the use of DREs does not 
eliminate the costs associated with printing ballots; it merely reduces the number of ballots that 
must be printed.  
Regardless of the number of ballots printed, these costs remain the same:  
♦ The labor cost of designing and laying out the ballot. 
♦ The one-time printer setup charges.  
Thus, while the use of DREs may reduce the total cost of printing paper ballots, the cost per ballot 
for printing absentee ballots and extra ballots is actually higher. In addition, cost breaks for large 
orders are reduced, further increasing the cost per paper ballot. 
Hidden Costs of DREs 
Because of the many hidden costs of DREs, any anticipated costs savings from their purchase and 
use are likely to prove illusory. Given that the initial capital outlay to acquire such machines can 
be two to three times more expensive than a comparable optical scan voting system, the 
                                                          
149 County priming public on new voting machines.  
San Diego Union Tribune; February 29, 2004; By Luis Monteagudo Jr. staff writer  
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20040229-9999-news_1m29voting.html 
150 County proceeds on touch-screen voting machines. 
San Diego Union Tribune; November 26, 2003 ; By Helen Gao, staff writer  
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/metro/20031126-9999_7m26vote.html 
151 Hi-tech voting machines 'threaten' US polls. Scientist warns that electronic votes cannot be 
safeguarded.  The Guardian; Monday February 16, 2004; Tim Radford and Dan Glaister 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uselections2004/story/0,13918,1149135,00.html 
 Campaign for Verifiable Voting in Maryland to Karl S. Aro, Department of Legislative Services, 
Annapolis, MD, Page 2; http://www.truevotemd.org/2003-12-22_Karl_Aro_Letter.pdf 
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deployment of touch screen voting machines to meet the needs of able-bodied voters appears to 
be an extravagant use of public funds. 
The hidden costs could easily negate (and overwhelm) any savings achieved from printing fewer 
paper ballots. Among these hidden costs are:  
1. Increased costs for secure and environmentally-controlled storage for these machines when 
they are not in use.  
2. Increased energy costs for keeping the backup batteries charged between elections.  
3. Increased labor costs for security when these machines are stored overnight at the polling 
place before an election.  
4. Increased costs for hardware maintenance and software upgrades for each of the thousands 
of such machines for a typical large county.  
5. Increased costs for expendable parts, including the backup batteries and smart cards used by 
these machines.  
6. Increased labor costs for verifying that each machine has the correct version of the software 
and firmware installed immediately before the start of every election and again immediately 
after each election is concluded.  
7. Increased labor costs for individually performing logic and accuracy tests on every one of 
thousands of machines prior to the start of every election and again immediately following 
each election.  
8. Increased labor costs for hiring additional poll workers (San Diego doubled the number of 
poll workers when it switched to DREs). 
9. Increased costs for poll worker training, both for longer training sessions and larger number 
of poll workers to train on using a much more complicated system. 
10. Massive costs for replacing these machines when they age and the technology they employ is 
no longer maintainable or supported by the vendor.  
Precinct-Count Optical Scan System + Ballot-Marking Device 
While some jurisdictions are purchasing DREs for every booth in every polling place, it is only 
necessary to have one booth with full accessibility to disabled persons. A system with one 
precinct-count optical scan system and one ballot-marking device is much less expensive and 
provides the additional value of a voter-verified paper audit trail (for details, see page 45).  
The equipment required for a precinct-count optical scan system is readily available from several 
major manufacturers of voting equipment. The cost for each polling place depends on the 
number of voting booths needed. The minimum number of booths would be one; the maximum 
would probably not be more than 10.  
OS Equipment needed per polling place Approx. Cost Each 
One precinct-count optical scanner with ballot box 152 $5,000 
As many voting booths as needed 153 $250 
                                                          
152 Example: Vogue Election Systems SpaceSaver 2000,  
http://www.vogueelection.com/products_spacesaver.html 
153 Example: Vogue Election Systems Vogue-I voting booth 
http://www.vogueelection.com/products_votingbooth.html 
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Enhancing each polling place's optical scan system to include an accessible voting method for the 
disabled would only require the addition of one ballot-marking device to accommodate the needs 
of blind, visually-impaired, and language-impaired voters. The devices print directly onto the 
same ballots completed manually by other voters and fed into the optical scanner.  
The AutoMARK, a ballot-marking device marketed by ES&S, was selling for about $5400 in the 
second quarter of 2005.154 So, figuring approximately $5,400 for the addition of the ballot-marking 
device, the following table shows the cost of three sizes of polling places:  
Polling Place Size Optical Scanner Voting Booths Marking Device Total 
1-voting booth $5,000 $250 $5,400 $10,650 
5-voting booths $5,000 $1,250 $5,400 $11,650 
10-voting booths $5,000 $2,500 $5,400 $12,900 
 
Precinct-count optical scan systems can provide a significant savings over DRE systems, even 
considering the additional costs of printing ballots, especially when you compare them with DRE 
systems that have voter-verifiable printers attached. 
The CalTech/MIT Voting Project report, published in July 2001, estimates that the cost of 
purchasing DREs without a voter-verifiable printer is over three times the cost of purchasing 
optical scanners. While the cost of operating DREs is about half the operating cost of optical 
scanners, it would take about 20 years of operation before the overall costs would be equivalent 
— and this doesn't account for the other hidden costs of DREs outlined on page 50.  
The CalTech/MIT report says:  
"Even though optical scanning systems have much higher operating cost, the difference 
in the acquisition cost is sufficiently large that the total cost of the optical scanning system 
is somewhat lower over the fifteen-year operating life of the machinery. If we assume a 
twenty year lifespan, the costs are identical." 155 
The CalTech/MIT study determined the acquisition and operating costs per voter as follows: 
Machine type Acquisition Operating 
DRE (Touch screen) $18-25/voter $0.5-1/voter 
Optical Scanning (in Precinct) $6-8/voter $1-2/voter 
The Vote-PAD 
This non-electronic assistive device (see page 46) can be used in conjunction with an optical scan 
system or hand-counted paper ballots.156 The cost is a minimal addition to the cost of printing 
ballots and could provide a reasonable solution, particularly for small paper ballot jurisdictions 
that do not want to, or cannot afford to, computerize their elections.  
The initial package costs approximately $1800 to $2200 for one polling place. This provides all 
necessary equipment and materials including twenty Vote-PAD booklets for use with twenty 
different ballots. At one Vote-PAD per polling place this would represent 20 elections or, on 
average, five years of elections. 
                                                          
154 The price of the AutoMARK has increased from $4,500 since the first publication of of "Myth Breakers." 
155 CalTech/MIT Voting Project, pages 23, 24. http://www.vote.caltech.edu/Reports/ 
At the time of this report, ballot-marking devices were not yet available, and voter-verifiable printers 
were not included in the capital costs of the DREs.  
156 http://www.vote-pad.us 
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Open Voting Consortium System 
OVC157 will provide free voting software that runs on standard PC hardware. In addition, each 
precinct needs a printer and a bar code reader. Counties may choose to install and run the 
software on rented equipment, or they may purchase re-marketed computers and sell them back 
after the election. Either way, counties avoid the costs of storage, maintenance, and toxic waste 
disposal of retired systems. Assuming a cost of $1,000 per computer and $200 per printer for each 
voting booth, and then $500 for a bar code reader, the capital cost for a 5-booth polling place 
would be $6,500. 
DREs with Integrated VVPAT Printer 
Certified systems currently available158 are comparable in cost to paperless DREs with an 
attached VVPAT printer. They range from about $3,600 to about $4,200 per machine.  
Estimated Capital Cost Comparison for Voting Systems 
The following table shows the cost for a typical polling place, which has five voting booths. Note 
that a 5-booth DRE system requires five DREs, while a 5-booth optical scan system requires only 
one optical scanner plus a method of allowing disabled individuals to vote. With the Vote-PAD, 
no computerized equipment is required. 
System Type 5-Booth Polling Place 
DREs with integrated VVPAT Printer  $20,000 
Paperless DRE System  $17,500 
Optical Scan + Ballot-Marking Device $11,650 
Optical Scan + the Vote-PAD $8,700 
Open Voting Consortium System $6,500 
Paper Ballots + the Vote-PAD $2,200 
 
                                                          
157 http://www.openvotingconsortium.org/ 
158 Examples: Avante, http://www.aitechnology.com/votetrakker2/home.htm;  
AccuPoll, http://www.accupoll.com/; and TruVote, http://www.truvote.com/ 
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7 Distinguishing Truth from Misinformation 
For many people today, it is difficult to tell legitimate reports from biased information. However, 
there is a growing number of credible studies and news reports that cast light on the subject of 
electronic elections.  
Reports by Computer Experts Discredit DRE Systems 
Johns Hopkins/Rice Report 159 
In July of 2003, four scientists from Johns Hopkins and Rice Universities had an opportunity to 
study the source code of the software used for Diebold tabulation equipment. The software was 
found, by Bev Harris of BlackBoxVoting.org, on an unprotected Diebold web page. The scientists 
who analyzed the source code wrote a 24-page report. The following excerpts are the first and 
last paragraphs of the abstract.  
Our analysis shows that this voting system is far below even the most minimal security 
standards applicable in other contexts.  
... We conclude that this voting system is unsuitable for use in a general election. Any 
paperless electronic voting system might suffer similar flaws, despite any "certification" it 
could have otherwise received. We suggest that the best solutions are voting systems 
having a "voter-verifiable audit trail," where a computerized voting system might print a 
paper ballot that can be read and verified by the voter.  
SAIC Report 160 
Wanting another opinion on the Diebold software, in early August 2003 the state of Maryland 
hired a third-party consulting firm (SAIC – Science Applications International Corporation) to 
perform an analysis of Diebold’s AccuVote-TS voting system.161  
On September 24, 2003, Maryland released a version of the report, but about two-thirds of the 
report was censored and remains secret because of concerns that the information it contains 
might enable malicious hackers to exploit the security vulnerabilities documented in the secret 
portions of the report. However, the non-secret portions of the report raise serious concerns 
about the security vulnerabilities of the Diebold touch screen systems currently in use. The final 
paragraph of the executive summary begins:  
The system, as implemented in policy, procedure, and technology, is at high risk of 
compromise. 
Despite the problems identified in the Johns Hopkins/Rice and SAIC reports, Maryland still 
proceeded with the $55.6 million dollar purchase of Diebold AccuVote-TS voting systems.  
                                                          
159 Analysis of an Electronic Voting System. July 23, 2003; By Tadayoshi Kohno, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel 
D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach http://avirubin.com/vote/ 
160 http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_search/technology/toc_voting_system_report/votingsystemreportfinal.pdf 
161 Risk Assessment Report: Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System and Processes. September 2, 2003; by 
SAIC. http://www.dbm.maryland.gov/dbm_search/technology/toc_voting_system_report/ 
votingsystemreportfinal.pdf 
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Ohio Compuware 162 
Another study, released in December 2003, was commissioned by the State of Ohio and 
conducted by Compuware Corporation. The scientists examined security vulnerabilities in four 
major vendors' touch screen machines: Diebold AccuVote TS, ES&S iVotronic, Sequoia AVC 
Edge, and Hart InterCivic eSlate. The study showed that all four of the voting machines had 
serious security problems. These problems are described in great detail in the report, which is 
over 200 pages long.  
Once again, an official report of a state government agency found numerous security 
vulnerabilities in these electronic voting machines. And yet all four of the machines covered in 
this report had previously been approved by the Independent Testing Authority, the federal 
certification authorities, and several state certification authorities. This points up the serious 
weaknesses in the existing certification procedures (see page 17 for more about testing). 
RABA Technologies Report 163 
In what appears to be yet another attempt to get a good report on the Diebold machines it had 
purchased, the Maryland legislature contracted for a practical test of the systems. It hired 
computer science experts to work with six machines for a week and attempt to hack the 
machines. The computer science experts gave the systems a failing grade. In addition, Diebold 
representatives said the test confirmed the accuracy and security of their systems.  
William Arbaugh, a University of Maryland assistant professor of computer science who 
participated in the test, graded the system an "F," "with the possibility of raising it to a 'C' 
with extra credit -- that is, if they follow the recommendations we gave them."  
"I was really surprised with the totality of the problems we found. Just about everywhere we 
looked we found them," Arbaugh said.  
Diebold officials could not be reached directly for comment. But in a press release, the 
company said Thursday that the study "validates" the Diebold election systems for the 
primary.  
Diebold President Bob Urosevich said in the release that the Raba (sic) Technologies 
report confirmed "the accuracy and security of Maryland's voting procedures and our voting 
systems as they exist today." 164 
Computer Expert's Analysis of Diebold Source Code 
Roxanne Jekot165 studied the Diebold source code that was discovered on an unprotected website 
in 2003. In an interview with Pokey Anderson, Ms. Jekot discussed the general quality of the 
programming: 166 
Well, you know, there were multiple things that I found. The two things that really -- not 
astonished, but surprised me -- was the lack of professionalism in the code itself. That was 
the first thing. Very unprofessional. Very thrown together, untested, it was a hodge 
podge of junk, that I don't think anybody really knew whether it REALLY worked or not. 
                                                          
162 http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/hava/files/compuware.pdf 
163 http://www.raba.com/press/TA_Report_AccuVote.pdf 
164 E-Vote Still Flawed, Experts Say. Wired News; January 29, 2004; by Kim Zetter 
http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,62109,00.html 
165 Ms. Jekot has been a computer programmer and consultant since 1984. She owns two copyrights on an 
accounting package. She has taught introductory programming at Lanier Technical Institute in 
Gainesville, Georgia and is currently working on an medical application, due for release in 2005. 
166 Interview with Roxanne Jekot of Georgia (CountTheVote.org). January 2004. By Pokey Anderson. 
http://www.countthevote.org/av/VernaMP3.mp3 
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The other thing was the division of a group of people working on a set of problems, and 
then a second group of only three people who worked on really critical programs, programs 
that would be required to manipulate the vote. Those were the two things that I think stood 
out, almost immediately. Again, the unprofessionalism. As an instructor, someone who's 
taught, I was surprised that the majority of the code looked like my first year college 
students, you know, doing a project. Very amateurish, very poorly put together. Very badly 
laid out, very poorly planned.  
Some Officials' Claims about Electronic Elections Don't Match the Facts 
Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox 
The claim:  "Though Georgia Secretary of State Cathy Cox said the state’s 26,000 elections voting 
machines performed without any problems on Super Tuesday earlier this week, 
some lawmakers Thursday said the machines may nonetheless be vulnerable to 
fraud and wanted printed receipts to serve as proof of the computer tabulation."167 
The facts:  Walker County, Georgia. March 2004 – Super Tuesday.  
Walker County election officials worked until after midnight, following 
Tuesday’s election, to rectify problems tallying results.  
Problems became apparent with Walker’s first returns about 9 p.m. when 
neighboring counties were wrapping up their tallies. A Diebold computer 
technician began providing incorrect numbers to news organizations. The 
botched returns were fed to the media for more than two hours after the polls 
closed before the problem was corrected.  
The voting machines have been used for six elections, three of which were for 
the same State House District 1 race. Problems have cropped up at every 
election.168  
Florida Secretary of State Glenda Hood  
The claim: March 8, 2004. "Well, I have a high confidence level. And it's based on the fact that, 
since 2002, when we put new equipment in place in the state of Florida, that we have 
had no problem whatsoever, according to our 67 supervisors of elections." 169  
The facts: Miami-Dade County, 2002: ES&S iVotronics failed to count 8.2% of the votes.170  
 Broward County, 2002: An ES&S iVotronic error missed counting 22% of the votes.171  
 Palm Beach County, 2002. Sequoia Edge touch screens froze up when the language 
was selected, sometimes switched votes to the opposite candidate.172  
 Broward County, January 2004: ES&S iVotronics lost 134 votes in a one-race election. 
The winning margin was 12 votes.173 
                                                          
167 Printers Wanted for Voting Machines. WXIA-TV Atlanta; March 5, 2004; Reported By: Keith Whitney  
http://www.11alive.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=43824 
168 Ballot card problems delayed election returns (Georgia). Walker County Messenger; March 4, 2004; Eric 
Beavers. Reproduced at: http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=1417 
169 Lou Dobbs Tonight. CNN; March 8, 2004; http://www.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0403/08/ldt.00.html 
170 Buyers' remorse.  Broward Daily Business Review; February 3, 2003; by Matthew Haggman  
http://verify.stanford.edu/EVOTE/buyers-remorse.html 
171 Election glitch missed 103,000 votes in Florida county. CNN; November 8, 2002 
http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/11/07/elec02.florida.votes.missing/ 
172 Human goofs, not machines, drag vote tally into next day. 
The Palm Beach Post, 14 March 2002; reported in "Black Box Voting" Chapter 2 by Bev Harris 
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Ohio Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell 
The claim: "The electoral system in Ohio worked well on Nov. 2. ... Problems and complaints 
were minimal."174 
The facts: Problems in the Ohio election led to a Congressional challenge of the Ohio electors, 
the first such challenge in over 100 years. A few of the problems are indicated on the 
Ohio map below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The claim: January, 2005. "Spokesman Carlo LoParo said these [precinct-based optical scan] 
machines - long Blackwell's favored technology - produce the required paper record 
and are more flexible and affordable than electronic machines."175  
The facts: March 2004. "Mr. Blackwell hopes to convert 14 counties using punch-card ballots to 
electronic voting by August special elections and 13 more for the Nov. 2 election." 176  
                                                                                                                                                                             
173 Votes from 134 residents were not counted. Miami Herald; January  07, 2004; By Erika Bolstad; 
http://www.miami.com/mld/ miamiherald/7655457.htm 
174 How Ohio pulled it off.  The Washington Times. November 17, 2004. By J. Kenneth Blackwell. 
http://washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20041116-085742-1497r.htm 
175 Ohio pulls plug on electronic voting. Blackwell opts for people filling out ballots by hand. Cleveland 
Plain Dealer Bureau. January 13, 2005. By Julie Carr Smyth. 
http://www.cleveland.com/news/plaindealer/index.ssf?/base/news/1105612399208372.xml 
176 Expert warns of balloting devices. Toledo Blade. March 18, 2004. By Jim Provance, Blade Columbus 
Bureau. Reproduced at http://www.votersunite.org/article.asp?id=1620 
Ballots in some 
precincts were 
counted twice
One precinct recorded 
negative 25 million 
votes.
One punch card machine 
counted 51 pres. votes 
for 289 voters.  
7% presidential 
undervote county 
wide. 
One precinct recorded 3893 
phantom votes for Bush. 
Votes were switched 
on 20-30 e-voting 
machines 
A dozen e-voting 
machines froze. 
Sole opscan machine 
broke down in one 
precinct. 
Jammed & inoperable machines 
reported throughout Toledo. 
Equipment malfunction 
caused 1.5 hr waits. 
Polls opened late. All 6 
punch card machines 
damaged in transit. 
Overcharged e-voting 
systems failed to start up. 
Arrows on absentee ballots 
didn't line up with punch holes. 
2 precincts had 25% 
presidential undervotes;  
2% rate county wide 
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New Mexico Secretary of State Rebecca Vigil-Giron 
The claim: December, 2004. "So-called phantom votes [more votes than voters] votes are not 
possible. ... If I would have found some irregularities, believe you me I would have 
brought them out and questioned them."177 
The facts: Bernalillo County, November 2004. 8,656 phantom votes were reported in the 
certified election results.178 
 San Juan County, November 2004. In Precinct 51, 1,843 election-day phantom votes 
were reported in the County Clerk contest179 
 Statewide, November 2004. 2,087 presidential phantom votes and more than 11,000 
in down-ticket races were reported in the official canvass report certified by the 
Secretary of State.180 
Missouri Secretary of State Matthew Blunt 
The claim:  "Secretary Blunt feels both the fax and e-mail voting options enabled many more of 
our men and women in uniform the opportunity to have their ballots counted in a 
timely fashion," Blunt spokeswoman Terri Durdaller said Friday.181 
The facts: "Just 54 ballots were submitted by either fax or e-mail, the data showed."182  
Some DREs Don't Provide Accessibility to the Disabled 
Feedback from 14 blind and visually impaired voters in Santa Clara County, California showed 
that many of them found the Sequoia voting machines unacceptable and were disappointed that 
Sequoia didn't listen to their suggestions. They said the machines performed poorly and were 
anything but user-friendly in the March election.  
In a letter to the registrar of voters after the March primary, Dawn Wilcox, a visually-impaired 
member of Silicon Valley Council of the Blind, wrote “Very few of our members were able to vote 
privately, independently, despite Santa Clara County's supposed 'accessible' touch screens. I feel 
this is an unacceptable state of affairs.”183 
Only two members said the machines had functioned smoothly. 
Among the criticism provided by voters was poor sound quality, delayed response time 
and braille that was positioned so awkwardly it could only be read upside down. Chen, 
the college professor, also said the audio message required blind voters to press a yellow 
button. "Yellow means nothing to me,'' Chen said. 
                                                          
177 Vote Recount Fight 'Is Not Over'.  Albuquerque Journal. December 24, 2004.  By Andy Lenderman. 
http://www.abqjournal.com/elex/278376elex12-24-04.htm 
178 Brief Summary of Bernalillo County Election Data. January 5, 2005. By Ellen Theisen. 
http://www.votersunite.org/info/BernalilloSummary.pdf  
179 http://www.votersunite.org/info/content/mess-up_010905.asp 
180 Brief Summary of New Mexico State Election Data. January 5, 2005. By Ellen Theisen and Warren 
Stewart. http://www.votersunite.org/info/SummaryFlyer.pdf 
181 Survey: Few troops use new voting options. News-Leader.com. January 8, 2004. By Kelly Wiese, 
Associated Press http://springfield.news-leader.com/news/today/0108-SurveyFewt-270021.html 
182 See previous footnote. 
183 Blind voters rip e-machines: They say defects thwart goal of enfranchising sight-impaired 
Mercury News; May 15, 2004; By Elise Ackerman 
http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/breaking_news/8673336.htm 
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[Noel Runyan, a blind voter and computer scientist who is an expert in designing 
accessible systems,] said the voting companies appeared to have ignored feedback they 
solicited from groups of blind voters as they were developing their systems. 
"I personally want them to be decertified for this election,'' Runyan said. "We need to 
make a strong statement that all these machines need to be redesigned on the user 
interface side. We've got a mistake here." 
In a conversation with VotersUnite, Noel Runyan said that these criticisms of the machines’ 
accessibility did not constitute a formal position of the Silicon Valley Council of the Blind. He did, 
however, emphasize that, “many of the visually impaired voters found that it was very 
frustrating and difficult or impossible to vote with the Sequoia voting systems.“  
He also pointed out, “One of the most glaring problems with the Sequoia system is the fact that it 
did not permit simultaneous speech output and large print display, as an option. Many low 
vision voters need to use both their hearing and whatever eyesight they may have to manage to 
navigate successfully through an electronic ballot. Forcing these folks to use either only speech or 
only large print will not permit them to vote independently.”  
Mr. Runyan also discussed the accessibility features of two other systems he has used: Diebold 
and Avante. He said that the Diebold systems provide audio and large print simultaneously, but 
“the Diebold speech quality and response time were so poor that elderly voters and others with 
hearing problems would have serious difficulties understanding the speech of the systems.”  
Avante, he pointed out, uses a low-quality “synthetic TTS (Text To Speech) system that is 
difficult for most older folks to understand.  Use of the synthetic voice was the primary reason 
that the Avante scored at the bottom in the Access World review.”  
Cleaning up Misconceptions about VVPAT 
Many arguments against a voter-verified paper audit trail are based on misconceptions. Here are 
the facts about a few of the most prevalent misconceptions. 
No systems require voters to verify their ballots 
Some proponents of paperless voting teach that VVPAT refers to systems that require voters to 
verify their votes.184 However, none of the supporters of (VVPAT) advocates requiring each voter 
to verify his or her paper record. The requirements for VVPAT pending in many state legislatures 
apply to the machines, not the voters. Machines would be required to provide a method by which 
voters could verify paper records, but voters would not be required to verify them.  
No System Provides a VVPAT for the Voter to Remove from the Polls 
The term "receipt" has been used by many who advocate a voter-verified paper audit trail. They 
point out that you get a receipt for deposits made at the ATM, and you should get a receipt for 
your electronic vote as well. Some proponents of paperless voting claim that VVPAT systems 
would allow voters to remove the paper records from the polling place, thus allowing for vote-
selling and coercing of voters.185 
However, in a VVPAT system the "receipt" is preserved like the ballot itself, and no system 
provides a ballot that the voter removes from the polls. All VVPAT systems require the paper to 
be retained by election officials and securely stored at the polling site.  
                                                          
184 Questions and Answers on Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines, page 5. 
The League of Women Voters of the United States. 2003. 
185 Questions and Answers on Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Voting Machines, page 8. 
The League of Women Voters of the United States. 2003. 
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No system requires poll workers to assist voters in verifying their ballots 
Some advocates for organizations of the disabled misunderstand how paper verification would 
operate for visually-impaired people. Voters could have their ballots read back to them through 
earphones by an automated audio facility. No poll workers would be involved. The secrecy of 
their ballots would not be violated. 
VVPAT does not violate the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Some people are concerned that providing different verification methods to sighted and blind 
individuals would be a violation of the law. The United States Department of Justice disagrees. It 
issued an official opinion, through its Office of Legal Counsel, stating that including a voter-
verified paper audit trail as a feature for a Direct Record Electronic (DRE) voting machines would 
be consistent with both the Help America Vote Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, so 
long as the DRE voting system provides a similar opportunity for visually-impaired voters to 
verify their ballots before those ballots are finally cast. 186 
Financial Ties of DRE Advocates to Vendors Suggests Bias 
Influential Advocate of Paperless DREs Received Large Donations from Vendors 
The Election Center bills itself as "An international service association of election and voter 
registration officials." According to its website, the organization, whose Executive Director is R. 
Doug Lewis, is a primary source of information for election officials. Election officials have told 
me that Lewis has been the primary source for years. The Center website says:  
We research specific questions from our members and provide timely answers to your 
questions. In more than 12 years of service to elections and voter registration officials, this 
service alone has been worth the price of membership. No other single location in America 
has the ability to find the answers to you (sic) elections related topics than The Election 
Center. 187 
Lewis claims to have organized the National Association of Secretaries of State and the National 
Association of State Election Directors, and "through them, Lewis told Harris he helps certify the 
[ITA] certifiers."188 
R. Doug Lewis is a major source of the arguments supporting paperless DREs and opposing a 
voter-verified paper trail. Early in 2003, the Election Center widely distributed a letter defending 
the security and reliability of DREs. His arguments have been refuted by many computer science 
experts, notably David Jefferson, a member of the California Electronic Voting Task Force, who 
wrote a point-by-point rebuttal of the letter.189  Nevertheless, Lewis's arguments are still quoted 
in the position papers of organizations that advocate paperless electronic voting.  
In March of 2004, it was discovered that, for years, the Election Center has been receiving large 
donations from the three major manufacturers of paperless electronic voting. Excerpts follow. 
The Election Center, which trains election workers and advises Congress and government 
agencies on election process issues, has taken donations from manufacturers of electronic 
voting machines even as it has issued strong statements supporting the security of the 
machines. 
                                                          
186 Memorandum Opinion For The Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division. 
October 10, 2003; http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/drevotingsystems.htm 
187 http://www.electioncenter.org/. Click on Membership Information. 
188 Electronic Voting Machines Blasted by Scientists, Hacked by Author. Scoop. July 25, 2003. 
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0307/S00198.htm 
189 http://verify.stanford.edu/EVOTE/ECresponse.html 
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... Its executive director, R. Doug Lewis, confirmed this week that the center had taken 
donations from makers of electronic voting machines - Sequoia Voting Systems Inc. of 
Oakland, Calif., and Electronic Systems & Software Inc. of Omaha, Neb. In addition, 
donations came from "probably Diebold" Inc. of North Canton, Ohio, Lewis said. 
... Lewis issued a report last year saying that "well-intentioned people, some of them even 
highly educated and respected, scare voters and public officials with claims that the voting 
equipment and/or its software can be manipulated to change the outcome of elections." 
The report went on to say: "Do not be misled into believing that elections are reliant upon 
technology which can be manipulated..." 
Lewis said he did not think accepting donations from the manufacturers presented 
any conflict of interest or breach of ethics. 190 
Activities sponsored by the Election Center have been questioned by election officials as well as 
concerned citizens. For example, in August 2004 the annual Election Center conference for 
election officials included a dinner cruise down the Potomac, sponsored by Sequoia Voting 
Systems. Freddie Oakley, County Clerk/Recorder in Yolo County, California, commented: 
I have been distressed for a long time that the Election Center, which holds itself out as 
the impartial association for election officials, engages in and appears to encourage this 
kind of industry subsidy of get-togethers of election officials.191  
ES&S Paid Commissions to Officials who Endorsed Their Products 
The Florida Association of Counties endorsed ES&S machines exclusively, as a result of the 
lobbying efforts of Sandra Mortham. Both the association and Mortham received commissions 
from ES&S on the equipment sold.  
A former Florida secretary of state profited by being a lobbyist for both the state's 
counties and the company that sold some of them touch screen voting machines used in 
last month's botched primary election.  
Sandra Mortham, who served as the state's top elections official from 1995 to 1999, is a 
lobbyist for both Election Systems & Software and the Florida Association of Counties, 
which exclusively endorsed the company's touch screen machines in return for a 
commission. Mortham received a commission from ES&S for every county that bought its 
touch screen machines. The exact terms have not been disclosed. 
... The association will receive about $300,000 in commissions, according to the 
agreement.192 
Fortune's Worst Technology of 2003: Paperless Voting 
Fortune magazine's winner of the worst technology of 2003 award was "Paperless Voting." 
Fortune considers this technology even worse than implanted identification devices, which only 
won the runner-up award.193 
                                                          
190 Excerpt from: Group that called electronic vote secure got makers' aid. Philadelphia Inquirer; March 15, 
2004; By Linda K. Harris. http://www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/world/8273865.htm 
191 Press Release: Voting Machine Manufacturers Wine and Dine Election Officials. Institute for Public 
Accuracy. September 1, 2004. http://www.commondreams.org/news2004/0901-08.htm  
192 Excerpt from: Lobbyist made money from touch screen sales. St. Petersburg Times; October 6, 2002. 
Associated Press. http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:WJT4jZ8WH0AJ:www.sptimes.com/2002/10 
/06/news_pf/State/Lobbyist_made_money_f.shtml+Florida+%2B+ES%26S+problems&hl=en&ie=UTF-8 
193 Winners and Losers of 2003: Worst Technology. Fortune Magazine; December 2003; By Peter Lewis  
http://www.fortune.com/fortune/technology/articles/0,15114,558787,00.html 
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Afterword 
One of the difficulties that faces a software company is the disconnect between the engineering 
department and the sales department. In order to please customers and make a sale, salespeople 
promise features that the engineering department is then obligated to develop.  
Sometimes, there is a serious discrepancy between the promises and the deliverables that are 
even possible — often because the sales people are not tech-savvy enough to know that what 
they are promising just won't work, sometimes because they are just too excited about the 
potential sale.  
I was discussing this recently with a client who used to be a software developer and is now a 
software salesman. I pointed out that he had an advantage since he knew what would be possible 
for his engineering department to develop. He responded by telling me a joke.  
Q. What's the difference between a used car salesman and a software salesman?  
A. The used car salesman knows when he's lying. 
In an attempt to "bring elections into the 21st century," election system manufacturers promised 
Congress and the elections community that their computer-based systems provide the following 
features: 
♦ Records and tallies votes accurately 
♦ Ensures the secrecy of the ballot 
♦ Operates reliably on election day 
♦ Provides security from tampering 
♦ Allows the disabled to vote independently 
♦ Ensures a satisfactory voting experience for voters 
♦ Prevents over-voting and reduces inadvertent under-voting 
♦ Simplifies the administration of elections 
♦ Reduces the cost of elections 
♦ Provides a paper audit trail 
♦ Meets federal standards for voting systems 
The facts presented in this document show that no such electronic election system presently 
exists. Is such a system even possible? My experience in the software development industry gives 
me grave doubts, but even if it were possible, would it provide the transparency required for 
democracy? No. 
When the founding fathers established a democratic republic in the Constitution, they did not 
promise that keeping it would be convenient. 
Eternal vigilance is the price of freedom. 
~Thomas Jefferson 
